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ABSTRACT
The standard for copyright infringement is the same across
different forms of expression. But musical expression poses special
challenges for courts deciding infringement disputes because of its
unique attributes. Tonality in Western music offers finite
compositional choices that will be pleasing or satisfying to the ear. The
vast storehouse of existing public domain music means that many of
those choices have been exhausted. Although independent creation
negates plagiarism, the inevitable similarity among musical pieces
within the same genre leaves courts in a quandary as to whether
defendant composers infringed earlier copyrighted works or simply
found their own way to a similar melody, harmony, rhythm, or formal
structure. This Article explores the knotty legal issues embedded in
copyright infringement cases involving musical expression and
suggests a methodology for cutting through the knots. By delving into
the historical development of Western music and tonality, it attempts to
connect music history and theory with copyright jurisprudence's
ultimate goal of balancing private protection of expressive works with
public access to them.
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Imagine two different people wearing the same or similar
perfume. Each person obviously retains his or her unique identity, at
least beyond the olfactory connection. A musical work similarly
retains its identity, even if one or more sections sound like-that is,
resemble or are structured somewhat like-another composition. Two
individuals wearing Chanel No. 5 may indeed smell alike but are
clearly distinctive human beings. Two popular songs likewise may
sound alike to the average person, but beneath this superficial
resemblance are quite different compositions. This Article explores
the troublesome aspects of copyright infringement doctrine as applied
to music in light of the policy goals of fostering creation, protecting
legitimate property rights, and avoiding undue monopolies of our
shared cultural heritage.
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Copyright law protects a creator's original work of authorship
from plagiarism.' As Western culture began to recognize creation as
the expression of the individual ego as opposed to a means of serving
the common good, the law evolved to provide protection for creative
works from encroachment by others.2  If one creates for the
community alone, then the expressive product theoretically belongs to
the community as a whole and can be borrowed and built upon by all
members of the community.3 If, on the other hand, individuals
produce creative works to express a part of themselves, to contribute
their unique vision to the world, or simply to make a living for
themselves and their families, then they naturally seek to prevent
others from using their work without permission.4 Copyright law
developed in England in the eighteenth century as the notion of the
autonomous creator began to take hold.5
The first US copyright law was patterned on its English
forebears and initially protected only books, charts, and maps.6
Several decades later, Congress amended the law to include musical
works.7 In the early to mid-nineteenth century, Europe was the center
of unparalleled Western musical achievements, as Beethoven,
Schubert, Mendelssohn, Schumann, Chopin, and Berlioz, among
others, produced numerous masterworks.8  European works
dominated the US musical scene.9 US classical and popular music,
1. See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2006) (defining exclusive
rights of copyright holder and providing a cause of action for infringement). Throughout this
Article, the Authors refer to both plagiarism and infringement. Plagiarism refers generally to the
unconsented appropriation of another's work, usually without attribution. Copyright
infringement is a subset of plagiarism and entails the unconsented appropriation of another's
copyrighted work, with or without attribution. Thus, one can plagiarize a public domain work
without legal liability-only societal disapproval. Plagiarism of a protected work, however, will
expose the plagiarizer to a potential lawsuit by the rights holder.
2. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 22-24 (1967) (describing
the emergence of a class of professional writers who sought legal "protection and recognition").
3. During the Renaissance, for example, authors were regarded either as craftsmen
who sought to manipulate received literary traditions so as to please the "cultivated audience of
the court" or individuals "inspired" by a muse or divine forces. See Martha Woodmansee, The
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author', 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426-27 (1984).
4. See id. at 426, 433.
5. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); Woodmansee, supra note 3, at
426-27.
6. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2006) (describing categories of copyrightable material)).
7. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 15, § 4, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2006) (describing categories of copyrightable material)).
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however, began to develop, and by the end of the nineteenth century,
domestic composers had generated a respectable body of work, though
largely derivative of European models,'0 and began to invoke
copyright law to protect their compositions." The use of copyright to
enforce rights in music has increased throughout the twentieth
century and into the new millennium.12
This Article examines the unique properties of music that
distinguish it from other expressive works, such as literary
compositions and works of visual art. It discusses how those unique
qualities have influenced the development of copyright for musical
compositions and how, in some cases, the courts have missed the mark
in trying to mold a copyright jurisprudence grounded in protection of
literary works around the musical sphere. Quite simply, music is the
only type of creative work that humans experience primarily through
the ear.'3 Humans largely absorb and recollect other expressive works
visually.14 Although this distinction may appear at first to be without
much legal significance, it should and does have considerable impact
on copyright doctrines such as access, independent creation,
infringement, and the use of experts in the litigation process.
This Article recognizes that music is a singular form of creative
expression and suggests that courts employ a different standard for
copyright infringement of musical works. Part I of this Article
contains a brief history of musical patronage in Western culture, as
10. See RICHARD CRAWFORD, AMERICA'S MUSICAL LIFE 372-82 (2001) (describing the
career of US-born, European-trained Edward MacDowell (1860-1908), one of the first notable US
composers). "MacDowell's career and music show America's dependence on Europe" in the late
nineteenth century. Id. at 381; see also NICHOLAS E. TAWA, MAINSTREAM MUSIC OF EARLY
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA: THE COMPOSERS, THEIR TIMES, AND THEIR WORKS 103 (1992)
(describing the emergence of "music nationalism" within the United States at the beginning of
the twentieth century).
11. See J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 412-14 (2004) (recounting the growth of
the US music industry and the creation and enforcement of the public performance right for
music copyright holders in the late nineteenth century).
12. UCLA and Columbia Law Schools sponsor a website containing notable copyright
infringement cases from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, along with samples of the
musical works involved, where available. This collection of cases reveals a marked increase in
copyright litigation over time. See Music Copyright Infringement Resource, UCLA SCH. OF L.,
http://cip.law.ucla.edulcases/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
13. For a discussion of the auditory and neurological mechanisms by which humans
discern and analyze sound, particularly music, see ROBERT JOURDAIN, MUSIC, THE BRAIN, AND
ECSTASY: HOW MUSIC CAPTURES OUR IMAGINATION 1-29 (1997).
14. See Andy Hamilton, Music and the Aural Arts, 47 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 46, 46 (2007)
("The visual arts include painting, sculpture, photography, video, and film. But many people
would argue that music is the universal or only art of sound."). Like dramatic works, music has
both visual and aural components. Musicians "read" music, but its expressive impact comes
when it is heard.
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well as an overview of the development of tonality in Western music.
Part II examines the general approach to copyright infringement that
courts use in music cases. Part III of this Article discusses copyright
issues that affect music plagiarism cases in a distinctive way,
including questions of access, independent creation, subconscious
copying, and the use of expert testimony to assist the trier of fact.
Part IV presents a case study drawn from a recent federal district
court decision that illustrates the difficulties besetting
judges-generally musical lay persons-in parsing two musical
compositions, one of which allegedly infringes the other. Part V
explores music infringement in an historical and musicological context
and offers observations about the challenges of forcing music into the
legal mold for copyright infringement developed primarily for literary
works. Finally, Part V suggests modifications to the current model for
proving infringement in cases involving musical works.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN MUSIC AND
TONALITY
Two widely accepted jurisprudential theories that justify
copyright laws are utilitarianism and natural law.15 Under utilitarian
theory, copyright laws should provide the optimal level of incentives
for creators to produce expressive works.16 According to this view, the
works thus created should eventually pass into the public domain for
the benefit of society as a whole.17 Under natural law theory, creators
have a moral right or entitlement to the fruits of their labors.18 The
15. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32-33 (1996).
16. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (referring to the economic
underpinnings of US copyright jurisprudence and stating that "copyright law serves public ends
by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones"); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-98 (1997)
(discussing the economic foundations of copyright law).
17. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900-02 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the importance of copyright as a mechanism for promoting increased production of
expressive works for the ultimate benefit of the public and underscoring the sanctity of the
public domain); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors.").
18. The works of philosophers John Locke and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel are often
cited as support for the natural law theory of copyright. Locke argued that man, through the
expenditure of effort, earned the right to the product of that effort. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690). Hegel
asserted that property was in some sense an extension of an individual's personality and thereby
indisputably his own. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 45 (T.M.
Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1953) (1820). For contemporary explications of this view, see
2312013]
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intellectual goods that they create are justifiably regarded as a type of
property subject to traditional property rights such as exclusion,
alienation, and use.19  Beyond utilitarianism and natural law,
commentators have offered other, less-heralded theories to justify
copyright.20
Whatever the theoretical justification for copyright legislation,
it is necessary to address the impact of that justification on the
standard for infringement in copyright cases. An infringement
standard that is too broad-that is, finds liability frequently-will
potentially result in the underproduction of creative works and the
failure to reward those who have created something genuinely
original. Paradoxically, an infringement standard that is too
narrow-that is, finds liability rarely-will have a similar effect.
Creators will be reluctant to publish new works for fear that others
can steal them and thus diminish the creators' economic rewards
without any negative consequences. Thus, it is essential to craft, as
best one can, an infringement standard that properly rewards creators
and deters infringers. This Article explores the special difficulties
associated with original musical compositions-difficulties that hinder
the development of the proper legal standard for infringement.
To fully understand the present doctrine concerning copyright
infringement in music cases, it is necessary to examine, at least
briefly, the historical framework in which music compositions were
created, underwritten, and subsequently borrowed. In addition, an
overview of Western tonality and practice illuminates the restrictions
that many contemporary composers face in creating new musical
compositions that are distinct from preexisting works but remain true
to their genre.21
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
19. See generally Hughes, supra note 18, at 293-97; Lior Zemer, The Making of a New
Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB, POL'Y 891 (2006) (discussing the Lockean theory of
copyright).
20. See Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for
Copyright Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 207 (2007); James Grimmelmann, The
Ethical Visions of Copyright Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005 (2009); Christian G. Stallberg,
Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying Copyright: An [sic] Universalistic-Transcendental
Approach, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 333 (2008).
21. The citation of selected musical compositions as documentation is the Author's (Dr.
Urbinato's) view of what constitutes aesthetic, stylistic, musical points of reference. Such points
of view are based on and supported by his experience as a university professor of music history
and theory and are supplemented by a dual career as a professional bassoonist and pianist
exposed to a vast repertoire of Western music: classical, pop, and folk. Aesthetic opinions are
[Vol. 15:2:227232
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A. A Brief History of Western Musical Patronage: Early Incentives for
Musical Creation
Before copyright laws, creators were incentivized to produce
expressive works without legal protection. The idea that creators had
enforceable rights in their works developed only in the post-Classical
era and was not fully embraced in the musical context until the
Romantic era of the nineteenth century.22 Before that point, authors
were prompted to create such works through the expectations and
support of societal institutions, the nobility, or wealthy individuals.23
The earliest recorded patron of Western musical composers was
the Roman Catholic Church.24 From the Middle Ages onward, the
Church encouraged or required musical composition by the clergy as
an appropriate means of intoning the Mass,25 extolling the Holy
Trinity of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, and
spiritually fortifying worshippers.26 Priests and monks rarely received
individual recognition or separate monetary compensation for
composing the unaccompanied recitational, liturgical, monophonic
singing known as chant,27 identified by the sixth century as Gregorian
chant.28 The concept of copyright as a means of providing legal
protection for expressive works did not exist, as many churches freely
circulated and shared these chants.29
inevitably subjective and cannot be proven in a traditional, analytic sense. Even a thorough
musicalltheoreticallformal analysis, technically understood by only highly trained musicians,
cannot prove such an aesthetic or stylistic conclusion. An aural documentation must be
experienced directly. A detailed theoretical analysis of cited compositions would be beyond the
scope of this work and its intended readers.
22. REINHARD G. PAULY, MUSIC IN THE CLASSIC PERIOD 205-06 (1965).
23. See infra notes 24-75 and accompanying text.
24. See Michael Hurd, Patronage, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com ("In medieval times ... the chief patron was the church.").
25. See ALBERT SEAY, MUSIC IN THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 15 (2d ed. 1975) ("Not only was it
considered as the appropriate medium for addressing God, but it was also understood as a tool by
which God and his works could be comprehended and interpreted.").
26. See J. PETER BURKHOLDER ET AL., A HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSIC 24-25, 51 (7th ed.
2006) ("The role of the music was to carry those words, accompany those rituals, and inspire the
faithful.").
27. See GEOFFREY WAINWRIGHT & KAREN B. WESTERFIELD TUCKER, THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP 244-45 (2005); Kenneth Levy et al., Plainchant, GROVE MUSIC
ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
28. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 31-32. Gregorian chant was also known
as "plainchant" or "plainsong." See James W. McKinnon, Gregorian Chant, GROVE MUSIC
ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
29. Susan Boynton, Plainsong, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL MUSIC
18-20 (Mark Everist ed., 2011) (describing evolution of liturgy and chant across Europe).
2013] 233
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As early as the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance
(c. 1300s), the burgeoning of a secular society interested in cultivating
the musical arts resulted in court patronage of musicians, composers,
and singers.30 Largely separate from the liturgical context, music
texts derived from medieval and Renaissance poetry, including that of
the Troubadours and the Trouvires.31 In sixteenth-century Germany,
guilds were organized to teach singing and musical composition, and
the completion of this musical training resulted in one's becoming a
Mastersinger.32 Musical language expanded beyond chant to the
natural rhythms and accents of texts based on courtly love, heroism,
chivalry, the virtues (or nonvirtues) of womanhood, and imitations of
nature.33 Although royal patronage increased during this period,
many composers such as Josquin, Palestrina, and DeLassus continued
writing masses and other liturgical works while receiving support
from the Church.34 In the late Italian Renaissance, the courts of the
Medici family3 5 in Florence and of the Gonzaga family36 in Mantua37
played an especially significant part in fostering secular composition,
as did those of the French kings and of the English king, Henry VIII. 3 8
By the Baroque era (c. 1600-1750),39 private patronage played
a substantial part in many composers' careers, as did newly formed,
30. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 71 ("Medieval music was shaped by
currents in the wider society: political developments, the emergence of nations and linguistic
regions, economic growth, social class, and support for learning and the arts."). As regional
nobility gained power, local "princes, dukes, bishops, and administrators . . . competed for
prestige by hiring the best singers, instrumentalists, and composers, which fueled the
development of music until the nineteenth century." Id. at 73.
31. See id. at 73-78. 'The most significant body of vernacular song in the Middle Ages
was the lyric tradition cultivated in courts and cities under aristocratic sponsorship. The
tradition began in the twelfth century with the troubadours . . . poet-composers in southern
France . . . and spread north to the trouvires . . . ." Id. at 76; see also John Stevens et al.,
Troubadours, Trouvires, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
32. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 258 ("The Meistersinger were urban
merchants and artisans who pursued music as an avocation and formed guilds for composing
songs according to strict rules and singing them in public concerts and competitions."). For a
fictional depiction of this tradition, see Barry Millington, Meistersinger von Niirnberg, Die, THE
NEw GROVE DICTIONARY OF OPERA, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
33. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 71-76.
34. See id. at 203-09, 228-35.
35. See Frank A. D'Accone, Medici, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxford musiconline.com.
36. See Claudio Gallico, Gonzaga, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
37. See Claudio Gallico, Mantua, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
38. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 155-57, 258-59.
39. See Stanley Sadie, The Baroque Era, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC, available
at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
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privately organized concert societies, opera companies, and other
choral organizations.40 But the greater patronage system of court and
church continued in full bloom.41 Major composers such as Bach,
Handel, and D. Scarlatti were among the many beneficiaries of this
system.42 Wealthy patrons commissioned composers for various works
and often dictated the type of composition to be created.43 The court of
Louis XIV famously employed a company of singers, dancers, a
Baroque orchestra, and smaller chamber ensembles, which fostered
the careers of Lully and Rameau, resulting in the composition of
opera, ballet, and chamber and orchestral music.4 4 The popularity of
instrumental music in Venice, from the late Renaissance on, gave rise
to the greatly expanded development of solo and chamber works for
strings, winds, and brass, all of which largely contributed to the
concept of the Baroque and the later Classical, Romantic, and Modern
symphony orchestra.45
From the early Classical Period (c. 1720s-1780) to its apex
(c. 1780s-1805),46 the patronage system continued to be centered in
the royal courts and in the Church.47  But it included further
patronage by professional music societies, which sponsored public
concerts.48 The increasing popularity of opera fostered the growth of
professional companies that depended on public support.49
The social and political revolutions of the late eighteenth
century brought about the decline of the aristocracy and, with it,
40. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 291-92.
41. See id.
42. Handel flourished as a composer of opera and oratorio as well as instrumental
music and relied on audience (i.e., public) support. PAUL GRIFFITHS, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
WESTERN MUSIC 118-19 (2006). As a composer of primarily instrumental (secular) music, Bach
was employed by the City of Anhalt-Cothen. Johann Sebastian Bach, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com. Scarlatti concentrated on solo
harpsichord sonatas while employed in Spain. Roberto Pagano et al., Domenico Scarlatti, GROVE
MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
43. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 292, 297.
44. See id. at 355-66, 434.
45. See id. at 264-65, 281-82.
46. See id. at 477-78; Stanley Sadie, The Classical Era, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
47. See Sadie, supra note 46 ("In 1750, most composers were employed by private
patrons or by the church . . . .").
48. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 471-77; see also The Classical Period, in 1
THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC 412, 413 (Denis Arnold ed., 1983) ("[T]he rise of concert
series, such as those in Paris, London, and Vienna, . . . attracted a broader audience than
formerly.").
49. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 497; The Classical Period, supra note 48,
at 413 ("The opera house was subsidized by the aristocracy but relied heavily on public
support .... ).
2352013]
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composers' and musicians' full-time employment in the royal courts.5 0
Composers became increasingly dependent on private music societies,
concert organizations, and opera companies for patronage.5 1 The
Church also continued to support and commission composers for new
liturgical compositions and to sustain traditional musical liturgical
practice.52
In the nineteenth century, private and royal patronage of
music existed side by side. Beethoven was the first major composer
who was never employed full-time by the courts.53 Rather, he
depended primarily on the private patronage of admiring aristocrats
as well as on private tutelage and the performance and sale of his
published compositions.54 Although in decline, the private patronage
system continued to benefit such early nineteenth-century composers
as Schubert, Chopin, Berlioz, and Schumann to varying degrees.5 5
But composers also earned income through private tutelage and in
other ways.56 Schubert taught school for a few years; Schumann
became a professional music critic, author, and beneficiary of
commissions from concert societies.57 Berlioz was a prolific author and
music critic, as well as a renowned conductor of the newly emerging
Romantic Symphony.5 8 Chopin taught a number of gifted piano
students and received generous support in his later years from the
novelist George Sand.5 9 The wealthy Mendelssohn, on the other hand,
neither needed nor depended on such patronage.60 With the rise of
50. Sadie, supra note 46 ("[Bly 1800, private patronage was greatly diminished and
increasing numbers of composers now had to make their living on a freelance basis, composing
and performing for a wider public.").
51. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 507, 526.
52. See id. at 525.
53. See id. at 576-79; see also Joseph Kerman et al., Ludwig van Beethoven, GROVE
MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
54. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 573, 576-79.
55. See Hugh Macdonald, Hector Berlioz, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com; Kornel Michalowski & Jim Samson, Fryderyk Franciszek
Chopin, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com; Robert Winter et
al., Franz Schubert, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
56. See, e.g., BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 624.
57. Id. at 606, 612. Schubert's career, in particular, suffered from the lack of wealthy
patronage "offered earlier in the century when Beethoven flourished in palatial residences."
Sigrid Wiesmann, Vienna: Bastion of Conservatism, in MUSIC SOCIETY AND THE EARLY ROMANTIC
ERA BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS: 1789 AND 1848, at 84, 95 (Alexander L. Ringer ed., 1990); see also
John Daverio & Eric Sams, Robert Schumann, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
58. See Macdonald, supra note 55.
59. See Michalowski & Samson, supra note 55.
60. See R. Larry Todd, Felix Mendelssohn, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://
www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF MUSIC
public piano recitals (beginning in Paris), concert societies throughout
Europe handsomely paid performers like Liszt.6' At the same time,
royal patronage continued to some degree: Liszt held an appointment
at the court of Weimar, where from 1848-1861 he strove to develop
the city as a major cultural center.62 Further, King Ludwig II of
Bavaria famously patronized Wagner; this support resulted in the
building of the Bayreuth opera house, the ultimate venue for Wagner
that persists to this day.63
Throughout the late nineteenth century, composers in the
major capitals of Western Europe typically depended on institutional
support (that is, employment) from music conservatories and
professional music organizations as well as individual support from
private beneficiaries.64 For fourteen years, an adoring fan, Nadezhda
von Meck, patronized Tchaikovsky.65 The newly founded Moscow and
St. Petersburg Conservatories provided employment for a bourgeois
group of newly professional composers, including Rimski-Korsakov
and Rubinstein.66 In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
France, the Schola Cantorum67 and the Paris Conservatory became
the major benefactors of such luminaries as Faur6, Massenet, and
Saint-Saens.68 Concert societies and private patrons also fostered the
careers of Debussy, Ravel, and others.69
In the early twentieth century, Stravinsky, exiled from Russia,
lived and worked in Switzerland and eventually Paris, where he
produced many major works, including the revolutionary The Rite of
61. See Alan Walker et al., Franz Liszt, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at bttp://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
62. Id.
63. The Festival at Bayreuth introduced Wagner's Ring Cycle as well as Parsifal. See
Geoffrey Skelton, Bayreuth, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.
com.
64. Music and Society, in 3 EUROPE 1789 TO 1914: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AGE OF
INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE 1565-73 (John Merriman & Jay Winter eds., 2006).
65. See Roland John Wiley, Pyotr Il'yich Tchaihovsky, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE,
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
66. FRANCIS MAES, A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN MUSIC: FROM KAMARINSKAYA TO BABI YAR
36-37, 170 (Arnold J. Pomerans & Erica Pomerans trans., 2002).
67. See Schola Cantorum, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
68. See Gordon A. Anderson et al., Paris, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://
www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
69. Franqois Lesure & Roy Howat, Claude Debussy, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com ("Debussy made his first appearance on the larger stage of
Parisian artistic society in 1893 . . . . [Debussy] became a close friend of Ernest Chausson, who
gave him both financial and moral support.").
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Spring (1913) for the resident Ballets Russes.70 By then, resident
composer-teachers became and have remained the norm of the
academic patronage system.71 From the late nineteenth century
onward, the rise of public concerts throughout Europe and the United
States spurred the formation of professional symphony orchestras,
opera houses, and concert societies, which supported solo, chamber,
and voice recitals.72 With the advent of recording, the commercial
market afforded further financial support.73
In presenting lighter fare, Broadway musical theatre and
Hollywood film studios provided "patronage" for a number of
composers, including Jerome Kern, George Gershwin, and, currently,
Stephen Sondheim.74  Today, nearly all of the aforementioned
elements come into play as a loosely amalgamated "patronage"
system, providing employment through universities and
conservatories, theatre and opera, the recording industry, and
concerts in commercial venues for touring.75
This brief overview of music patronage reveals that composers
can be encouraged to write musical works even without the
protections of copyright law. The desire for divine favor, a sense of
religious obligation, the impulse to curry favor with the royal court,
the allure of public admiration, and the profound need to express
oneself can all fuel a composer's efforts to create. But in the modern
day, many of these historic incentives have disappeared; the prospect
of financial reward remains a primary motivator for artistic creation,
particularly composition and performance of popular music. 76
Musicians cannot fully realize that reward, as this Article discusses,
without legal protection against infringement.
70. See Stephen Walsh, Igor Stravinsky, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
71. See Hurd, supra note 24 ("Composers were sometimes obliged to undertake general
musical work in order to supplement their precarious incomes-conducting, performing,
teaching, music criticism, and so on.").
72. See HENRY RAYNOR, THE ORCHESTRA 174-79 (1978) (describing the growth of the
orchestra system in Europe and the United States).
73. For an overview of the development of the US music industry, see MICHAEL FINK,
INSIDE THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: CREATIVITY, PROCESS, AND BUSINESS 3-25 (2d ed. 1996).
74. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 902-04.
75. See Hurd, supra note 24 ("Patronage of a kind continues today in the form of
commissions from performing organizations, individual artists, and festivals, often supported by
commercial sponsorship.").
76. Of course, many individuals still find satisfaction, apart from monetary
compensation, in creating music for online sharing, church worship, garage bands, and
community theatre.
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B. The Components of Composition: Music Theory as a Complex Aspect
of Music Infringement Cases
Determining copyright infringement is a multilayered process
that ends with an assessment of whether the defendant's work is, from
the perspective of the ordinary lay observer, reader, or listener,
substantially similar to the plaintiffs work. Courts often use expert
testimony to determine whether, from a technical standpoint, the
defendant is likely to have copied from the plaintiff.77 In music cases,
experts have assumed greater importance than in cases involving
other types of creative works because the technical aspects of music
composition and theory are often unfamiliar to a lay judge or jury.78
The music expert can put a musicological framework around both
works and give an opinion as to whether the patterns of notes and
chords appearing in the defendant's work are likely to have been the
product of independent creation, reliance on a common public domain
source, or copying of the plaintiffs work.7 9 Thus, in analyzing judicial
opinions in music infringement cases, it is useful to have some
understanding of the basics of Western music theory and composition.
1. Tonal Practice in Western Music: The Basics
An understanding of the musical achievements of the Common
Practice Period,80 as discussed above, reveals a fundamental
correspondence between virtually all Western music and the precepts
of what is known as tonality.8' Various pitch organizations, whether
melodic, harmonic, or contrapuntal, concepts of consonance and
dissonance, and corresponding rhythms, beats, accents, and formal
77. See Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 945-46 (8th Cir. 1992)
(describing use of experts in the extrinsic phase of the substantial similarity analysis).
78. As one Eighth Circuit justice explained:
I have played the tape which contains the two musical compositions and although I do
not know the difference between be-bop, hip-hop, and rock and roll, the tunes all
sound the same to me. This may be because I have no ear for music other than
reflecting my generation's preference for the more soothing rhythms of Glen Miller
and Wayne King or the sophisticated beat of Woody Herman playing the Wood
Chopper's Ball. Obviously judges have no expertise to resolve this kind of
question ....
Id. at 948 (Lay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
79. See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing extensive
expert affidavits submitted by both parties); Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV 08-2170 CAS
(CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011).
80. See WALTER PISTON & MARK DEVOTO, Introduction to the First Edition (1941) of
HARMONY xx (4th ed. 1978) ("[T]he period in which this common practice may be detected
includes roughly the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.").
81. Id.
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structure, are all rooted in the organization of eight notes on or
around one principal tone-hence, tonality.82 Through centuries of
practice, the most gifted and influential composers have permanently
established what we now call common practice.83 Whether listening to
an esoteric work of Bach, a tone poem of Debussy, a Johann Strauss
waltz, a Beatles tune, Frankie Valli's "Can't Take My Eyes Off of
You," or Whitney Houston's "I Will Always Love You," the informed
ear will recognize the melodic, tonal, rhythmic, and formal similarities
among all these works.84 Popular music distills the earlier and
generally more complex, layered musical elements of classical music
into a more speech-like style usually encapsulated in a simple two- or
three-part form, organized into four eight-bar phrases.85
The establishment of Western tonality roughly coincides with
Newton's discovery of gravity in the late seventeenth century.86
Tonality may be defined as a musical theoretical concept centered on
one primary pitch or tone (that is, gravity), which at least seven other
pitches or chords gravitate away from and finally back to.8 7 The seven
subsidiary pitches are arranged in a fixed series of whole and half
steps known as major, minor, or modal scalar patterns within an
octave. These pitches respectively may be major: C, D, E, F, G, A, B,
and C;88 melodic minor: C, D, E flat, F, G, A (A flat), B (B flat), and C;
or harmonic minor: C, D, E flat, F, G, A flat, B natural, and C.89
These scalar intervals may also be arranged in patterns of
whole- and half-step intervals similar to, but different from, standard
82. See Brian Hyer, Tonality, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
83. Id.
84. See JOHANN SEBASTIAN BACH, Mass in B Minor (1749); CLAUDE DEBUSSY, La Mer
(1905); JOHANN STRAUSS, Tales From the Vienna Woods (1868); THE BEATLES, Yesterday, on
HELP! (Parlophone 1965); FRANKIE VALLI, Can't Take My Eyes Off Of You, on THE 4 SEASONS
PRESENT FRANKIE VALLI SOLO (Philips 1967); DOLLY PARTON, I Will Always Love You, on JOLENE
(RCA 1974); WHITNEY HOUSTON, I Will Always Love You, on THE BODYGUARD (Arista 1992).
85. See John Covach, Form in Rock Music: A Primer, in ENGAGING MUSIC: ESSAYS IN
MUSIC ANALYSIS 69-74 (Deborah Stein ed., 2005).
86. See MANFRED F. BUKOFZER, MUSIC IN THE BAROQUE ERA: FROM MONTEVERDI TO
BACH 219 (1947) ("Tonality was not 'invented' by a single composer or a single school. It emerged
at approximately the same time in the Neapolitan opera and in the instrumental music of the
Bologna school and was codified by Rameau more than a generation after its first appearance in
music.").
87. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 305, 365; Hyer, supra note 82; see also
Tonality, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
88. See William Drabkin, Major, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
89. See William Drabkin, Scale, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com; see also Scale, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
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major and minor models. These are known as modes rather than
keys.90 Examples include the Dorian mode: D, E, F, G, A, B, C, and
D, 91 and Phrygian mode: E, F, G, A, B, C, D, and E. 92 The various
forms of major and minor modes gravitate toward their final central
pitch. Modal forms may cadence on a related pitch other than their
usual center of gravity (key pitch).93 The succession of scalar pitches
may be, in effect, infinitely varied to form two predominant musical
elements: melody and harmony.94
In summary, as noted above, the formal and tonal practices
established through the nineteenth century provide the foundation for
Western popular music, which draws upon what may be called its
prior art. The greater one's knowledge and understanding of this art,
the better one's perception of what is original, what is not, and
especially, what is borrowed. Further, the greater one's knowledge,
the greater one's ability to distinguish between commonplace-that is,
conventional-practice and the seemingly new or original application
of long-established musical conventions of tonality.95
2. Historical Evolution of Tonality
Tracing this prior art back to its origins, one begins with the
monophonic style of early Christian chant, which was a part of
Christian liturgical music since at least the fourth century.96 Its later
expansion to include one or two more separate, but related, melodic
voices organized around the primary chant was known as Organum.97
90. See Modes, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIc, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com.
91. Dorian Mode, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUsIc, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
92. Phrygian Mode, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
93. See William S. Rockstro et al., Cadence, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
94. See Alexander L. Ringer, Melody, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, http://www.oxford
musiconline.com; see also Carl Dahlhaus et al., Harmony, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com; Melody, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
95. As the great director Alfred Hitchcock once observed, there are no new plots, no new
characters, but only new personalities that make them seem new.
96. See SUZANNE LORD, MUSIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A REFERENCE GUIDE 25-27 (2008)
(discussing forms of pre-Gregorian chant).
97. These additional voices, in contrast to the horizontal melodic concept of chant,
typically formed the vertical and simultaneous intervallic sonorities of octaves, perfect fourths,
or fifths. See BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 26, at 85-88. "The original chant melody is the
principal voice, the other the organal voice, moving in exact parallel motion a fifth below.. . . In
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Thus began the concept or effect of harmony-that is, a harmonious
combination of simultaneous tones or melodies.98 Diverging from the
medieval practice of Organum, the fifteenth-century English composer
John Dunstable and a few lesser-known composers conceived of the
interval of a major third as consonant with the central pitch.99 They
thus planted the seeds for a primal concept of modality and its
then-distant cousin, tonality (or key).'00
The primary elements of Renaissance counterpoint up to and
including the late sixteenth century became increasingly complex.101
By the 1580s in Florence, a group of Renaissance scholars, artists,
intellectuals, and classical musicians known as the Camerata
attempted to revive ancient Greek drama, as they perceived it.102
They, along with two principal singers and composers, Peri and
Caccini, developed a musico-dramatic style of solo singing known as
Monody.103 Influenced by the simpler Renaissance styles in folk
music, secular song, and dance, as well as the Renaissance's modal
harmony, the concept of a separation and coordination of melody and
harmony, or melody and accompaniment, was born.104 This new
style's texture, in contrast to the multi-voiced contrapuntal
early organum, the organal voice is normally sung below the principal voice. Either or both
voices may be doubled at the octave ... to create an even richer sound." Id. at 88.
98. See Dahlhaus et al., supra note 94.
99. See Third, THE HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 744 (Willi Apel ed., 2d ed. 1968)
("As an integral element of harmony the third appeared in the sixth-chord style of the 14th
century; of melody, in the works of Dunstable, c. 1400 . . .. It may be noticed that, prior to 1500,
the third was not admitted in the final chord.").
100. See Key, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com.
101. This increasing complexity was found in melodic shape, harmonic combinations,
rhythmic diversity, and melodic/intervallic relationships (often a result of otherwise independent
melodic lines) and can be traced to the advancement of the depiction of the text in religious and
particularly in secular vocal compositions.
102. Bukofzer described the Camerata:
This group based its attack on renaissance music on the handling of the words. They
claimed that in contrapuntal music the poetry was literally "torn to pieces"
(laceramento della poesia), because the individual voices sang different words
simultaneously. . . . As a result of such theoretical discussions, the recitative was
created, in which contrapuntal writing was altogether abandoned.
BUKOFZER, supra note 86, at 5.
103. See Nigel Fortune & Tim Carter, Monody, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
104. Accompaniment can take a variety of forms:
In the most general sense, the subordinate parts of any musical texture made up of
strands of differing importance. A folksinger's listeners clap their hands in
accompaniment o the song; a church organist keeps the congregation to the pitch and
tempo with his or her accompaniment; the left hand provides the accompaniment to
the right in a piano rag ....
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Renaissance style, was known as homophonic.06 Basic homophonic
chordal structure then became more or less standard as a vertical
simultaneity of the pitches of a major or minor third and a perfect
fourth contained within the gravitational pitches of an octave.106
This new monodic style,10 7 Stile Moderno,10 fulfilled the
dramatic necessity of comprehending the text as sung by solo singers
and formed the basis for the early Italian madrigal as well as the
earliest forms of opera.09  The impetus to expand the musical
language beyond the sober, religious texts of the Renaissance gave rise
to freer musical and dramatic expression.110 Yet the basic harmonic
structures remained tonal or modal constructs of thirds encompassed
within an octave.11' With the exception of seventeenth-century
modality, these tertian harmonic structures112 form the basis of
Western music from about 1700 to 1900, the Common Practice
Period.113 This tonal practice continued to play a prominent role in
the music of the twentieth century as well, either largely intact or
modified by contemporary practice, alongside various negations of the
conventional tonal practices.114
David Fuller, Accompaniment, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com.
105. See Homophony, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
106. Modal modifications of this setup were also common; chordal progressions of these
structures (chords/harmonies) were not standardized until the 1680s in Italy, in particular. By
then the theoretical concept of key was well established and continues to this day. See Key, THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIc, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
107. See Fortune & Carter, supra note 103; Emma Wakelin, Monody, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
108. See Moderno Stile, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com.
109. See Wakelin, supra note 107.
110. Called upon to express such emotional and dramatic states as jealousy, suspense,
passion, sexuality, death, murder, and pastoral languor, as required of Monteverdi's Orfeo
(1607), for example, composers could explore a much freer, more varied use of dissonance,
melodic shape, rhythm and chordal/harmonic movement.
111. Take, for example, the work of Monteverdi:
Accepting the radical stile rappresentativo [monody] of the Florentines and infusing it
with his intense pathos Monteverdi realized at the same time the dramatic
possibilities . . . and the instrumental interlude, which the Camerata had
discarded... .The pastoral and infernal spheres are sharply profiled in Monteverdi's
music by coloristic means; the infernal regions are overshadowed by somber choruses
in the lower register, dark brass instruments, and the reedy and nasal regal serving
as continuo instrument.
See BUKOFZER, supra note 86, at 58-59.
112. See Tertiary Harmony, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com.
113. See PISTON & DEVOTO, supra note 80.
114. See infra Part I.A.4.
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By the end of the Baroque period (c. 1750), the demands of the
highly evolving and progressive forms of opera; and other musical
forms including: instrumental works such as symphonies,115
sonatas,116 and concertos;117 large religious settings of the Mass; and
other religious choral works influenced by opera, gave rise to even
greater levels of harmonic complexity.118 But major and minor (and,
less often, modal) chord structures in root position, sequences,
inversions of the chord structures, and modulation away from and
back to the original key remained standard harmonic practice.119
Again, the gravitational pull of tonality established a musical theory.
Even before the stupendous contrapuntal, harmonic, and
formal expressive achievement of J.S. Bach, however, musical styles
had begun to change.120 The avowed seriousness of the German style,
along with the French-Italian style, gave rise to the style of Gluck,
Haydn, Mozart and early Beethoven, all of whom combined elements
of both styles to form the Classical style (c. 1780-1805).121 The
expansion of key as well as the harmonic experimentation of
Beethoven fostered a greater freedom of dissonance and gave rise to a
bolder, heightened sense of tonality.122 Following the Western social
115. Jan Larue et al., Symphony, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
116. Sandra Mangsen et al., Sonata, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
117. Arthur Hutchings et al., Concerto, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
118. See Baroque, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com ("It was a period in which harmonic complexity grew alongside emphasis on
contrast.").
119. The major expansion of the basic chord structure included the addition of a minor
third above the second third, which is thus called a seventh chord. See Seventh Chord, GROVE
MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
120. Commenting on the indefiniteness of historical periods in music, Pauly explained:
[SItylistic periods cannot be defined by exact dates. For the Classic period, this means
that numerous manifestations of the new music's outlook and style appeared before
the Baroque had spent its force. . . . The death of Bach in 1750 has often been chosen
to symbolize the end of the Baroque era, but by the time Bach had composed the Art of
Fugue [a defining work of Baroque polyphonic style], his son Carl Philipp Emanuel
had already written keyboard sonatas in a distinctly new style.
REINHARD G. PAULY, MUSIC IN THE CLASSIC PERIOD 8 (4th ed. 2000).
121. See Classical, THE NORTON/GROVE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC 169 (Stanley
Sadie ed., 1994) (describing the term "classical" as having multiple applications, but saying "its
chief application is to the Viennese Classical idiom which flourished in the late 18th century and
the early 19th, above all in the hands of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven. . . . [M]ost of Gluck's
'reform' operas, composed at the beginning of this period, are based on classical subjects").
122. See, e.g., LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, Symphony No. 3 (1804).
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revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the fine arts championed
individual freedom of expression.123
By the mid-nineteenth century and toward the late 1880s, the
chromaticism of Wagner and Liszt had, at times, all but negated the
feeling of key, particularly in Tristan and Isolde (1857-1859).124 The
seemingly free flight of a tonal center (key) and the far-reaching
influence of Wagner's most chromatic work paved the way for the two
major inroads into twentieth-century classical harmonic style:
Impressionism and Expressionism.12 5 Myriad examples of Wagner's
appropriated style precede these inroads and may be found principally
in Franco-German works and early Debussy.126  German
appropriation is manifested primarily in the works of Richard
Strauss,127 Mahler,128 and early Schbnberg.129
3. Modern Advancements in Traditional Tonal Practice
The first major inroad into twentieth-century classical
harmonic style was Impressionism.130 In late nineteenth-century
France, traditional tonality was often altered to include the addition of
major sevenths, ninths, elevenths, and thirteenths to the basic tonal
chords.131 These extended tertian structures were often treated as
123. In the works of Schubert, Chopin, Schumann, Mendelssohn, Berlioz, and Liszt up to
c. 1850, traditional harmony is expanded in a variety of ways. The alteration of the inner voices,
usually thirds or compounded thirds (ninths, elevenths, or thirteenths) infused otherwise
traditional harmony with an unprecedented richness of emotional states, an intimacy of personal
feeling beyond which words cannot penetrate. Added to this are the often-pervasive chromatic
chord progressions (instead of or alongside the standard ones) to, away from, and back to the
key. For a discussion of this period, see generally GRIFFITHS, supra note 42, at 177-89.
124. See Barry Millington, Tristan und Isolde, THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF OPERA,
available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com. Alfred Einstein further described the
emblematic accomplishment of Tristan and Isolde:
The harmony, moreover, in the predominantly chromatic inventiveness of motifs is
more novel and refined. All the elements in this harmony-its suspensions, its
alterations, and tensions-had been already present, individually, in Spohr, in Liszt,
and even in Mozart. But in Wagner these elements, in a system that has turned into
something very personal, have a new effect; with Tristan [and Isolde] one realm of
harmony closes and a new one begins.
ALFRED EINSTEIN, MUSIC IN THE ROMANTIC ERA 238-41 (1947).
125. ROBERT GREENBERG, How TO LISTEN TO GREAT MUSIC: A GUIDE TO ITS HISTORY,
CULTURE, AND HEART 296-97 (2011).
126. Examples include Debussy's Beau Soir, as well as his Podmes de Beaudelaire.
127. See RICHARD STRAUSS, Don Juan (1888).
128. See GUSTAV MAHLER, Fifth Symphony (1902).
129. See ARNOLD SCHONBERG, Gurrelieder (1913).
130. See Richard Smith, Impressionism, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MUSIC, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
131. Salzman described those alterations:
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consonant sonorities, not in need of resolution as dissonant or
nonharmonic tones.132 Traditional tertian structures in the music of
Debussy, Ravel, and Faur6 often include added major seventh or ninth
chords as consonant (unresolved) intervals.133 The latter is a practice
often associated with the so-called jazz harmonies of Duke Ellington,
Miles Davis, and many other jazz greats.134
A second major inroad into progressive twentieth-century tonal
and harmonic advancement may be found in the Expressionistic135
works of early Richard Strauss, Mahler, and Schonberg.136 Heavily
Characteristic are chains of triads, of seventh, ninth or eleventh chords, or of related
structures built on fourths or major seconds arranged in pentatonic, whole-tone,
diatonic, or chromatic patterns, the last-named including free, sliding chromatic shifts
based on "secondary function" chords but often arrived at through parallel or
sequential motion.
ERIC SALZMAN, TWENTIETH-CENTURY Music: AN INTRODUCTION 22 (4th ed. 2002).
132. See Impressionism, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com. The hallmarks of impressionism are defined as follows:
Some of the technical features of musical impressionism included new chord
combinations, often ambiguous as to tonality, chords of the 9th, 11th, and 13th being
used instead of triads and chords of the 7th; appoggiatura used as part of the chord,
with full chord included; parallel movement in a group of chords of triads, 7ths, and
9ths, etc.; whole-tone chords; exotic scales; use of the modes; and extreme
chromaticism.
See id.
133. Thus, in Debussy's Afternoon of a Faun (1894) are found progressions of parallel
thirteenth chords, also known as chord streams (which may include parallel ninths or elevenths
in parallel progressions). The further incorporation of whole-tone sonorities to this colorful
palette produces a more vague sense of key whose tonal contours are blurred. This blurred
suggestion of key parallels the Impressionist movement in French art and literature, which had
begun about twenty years earlier. See id. The definition of impressionism mentions this parallel:
Term used in graphic art from 1874 to describe the work of Monet, Degas, Whistler,
Renoir, etc., whose paintings avoid sharp contours but convey an "impression" of the
scene painted by means of blurred outlines and minute small detail. It was applied by
musicians to the mus[ic] of Debussy and his imitators because they interpret their
subjects (e.g. La Mer) in a similar impressionistic manner, conveying the moods and
emotions aroused by the subject rather than a detailed tone-picture.
Id.
134. See PAUL F. BERLINER, THINKING IN JAZZ: THE INFINITE ART OF IMPROVISATION
73-74 (1994) (noting that jazz "chords typically include selective mixtures of the pitches of a
major or minor triad (the first, third and fifth degrees of its related scale), the triad's diatonic
upper extensions or tensions (its seventh, ninth, eleventh and thirteenth degrees), and the triad's
altered extensions (its flatted-ninth, raised-ninth, raised-eleventh, and flatted-thirteenth
degrees)").
135. See David Fanning, Expressionism, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
136. As William Austin explained:
Tonality in Mahler's music is peculiar.. . . Mahler himself never abandoned tonality;
it is as strong a force in his last works as in his earliest. But it does not work in any of
them as it does in Beethoven. . . . The harmony of The Song of the Earth is the most
peculiar of all, and most convincing. . .. Mahler made ample use of pentatonic scales,
and occasional use of a whole-tone scale, blending these smoothly into his diatonic and
chromatic habits-so smoothly that their presence may easily be ignored; . . . there is
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influenced by Wagner's pervasive chromatic style, these composers
pushed levels of dissonance to an unprecedented egree.137 Schonberg,
in particular, composed in a style inaccurately dubbed "atonal," that
is, music with no fixed tonal center.138 Voicing of chords, density of
texture (rhythmic and tonal), extreme ranges (both high and low), and
an attempt to avoid or disguise tonal-sounding chords such as major
or minor triads may suggest no traditional key center. But a close
analysis may reveal a concealed concentration of a tonal center, if not
a traditional sense of key.139 Chords built in fourths may replace the
traditional tertian structures.
Schonberg, on the other hand, believed that the breakdown or
expansion of traditional tonality had run its course.140 To this effect,
he developed a style of composing called dodecaphonic, in which any or
all twelve tones could function in effect as a kind of nontonal key.141
Thus, composers avoided or de-emphasized structures built in thirds,
octaves, and open fifths (the basic tenets of tonality) should they ever
suggest raditional tonality. 142
nowhere any such obvious departure from Western norms as there is in Debussy or
Puccini.
WILLIAM W. AUSTIN, MUSIC IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM DEBUSSY THROUGH STRAVINSKY
127 (1966).
137. Fanning described the expressionist characteristics of one of Schonberg's works:
1909 was Schoenberg's expressionist annus mirabilis, the highpoint being Erwartung.
The story of this one-act monodrama-that of a woman searching for her lover in a
forest at night, finding his dead body, and in the course of her dementia virtually
confessing to his murder-is again understandable on one level as a kind of personal
catharsis. Schoenberg composed the music in a torrent of inspiration in 17 days,
barely enough time to write down the notes of the extremely dense and refined score.
The musical language is quintessentially expressionist in its avoidance of repetition
and denial of stability in all parameters, including tempo. Harmony is chromaticized
to the point where it forms a more or less static backdrop, in a constant state of flux
and only occasionally falling back on more tonally reminiscent formations when the
woman is in a state of emotional regression.
See Fanning, supra note 135.
138. Austin described Schdnberg's deliberate new style:
Schoenberg wrote a footnote, taking account of the label "atonal," which seemed to
him absurd. He proposed a better label, if any label were needed-"pantonal," but he
insisted that no label could substitute for a study of the facts. In spite of Schoenberg's
protest .. . the word stuck as a label for Schoenberg's mature style.
AUSTIN, supra note 136, at 204-09.
139. See Chandler Carter, Stravinsky's "Special Sense": The Rhetorical Use of Tonality in
The Rake's Progress, 19 MUSIC THEORY SPECTRUM 55, 59 (1997) ("Schoenberg saw himself ... as
having freed music from the shackles of tonality." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. Peter Kalkavage, Music in the Modern Age, THE FREE LIBRARY, http://www.thefree
library.com/Music%20in%20the%2OModern%2OAge-a0120037483 (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
141. Dodecaphonic, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
142. Schbnberg's primary early disciples, Berg and Webern, followed the same principles
in their own way, with Berg incorporating more tonal interpolations within his dodecaphonic
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Unlike Schbnberg, Stravinsky did not believe that tonality was
dead.143  Like the French, Stravinsky flavored traditional tonal
structures with chords of the added sixth, seventh, and ninth as
consonance, rather than dissonance. Thus, there was no need for
resolution in the traditional major or minor (or modal) triadic
sonorities.144 Along with Milhaud, Honegger, and Poulenc, Stravinsky
wrote bitonal or polytonal structures as well. 145 Although levels of
dissonance were often high, they were frequently based on
combinations or mixtures of triadic tonal major, minor, or modal
harmonies.146 Prokofiev and Shostakovich, influenced as they were by
the French, appropriated a similar usage.147
Both Stravinsky and Prokofiev lived in Paris at the height of
this movement known as Neo-Classicism (c. 1918-1950s).148 This
movement in many ways paralleled the development of Cubism by
Picasso, Braque, and others.149 Just as artists looked at the natural
world or the human figure from different angles at the same
time-Picasso's groundbreaking Les Demoiselles DAvignon, for
example-these Neo-Classical composers regarded tonality in a
related way.150
sonorities. See SALZMAN, supra note 131, at 37-44.
143. See Carter, supra note 139, at 59 ("Stravinsky, on the other hand, invoked, shaped,
and displayed tonal conventions in order to underscore other anachronistic musical
gestures . . . .").
144. See IGOR STRAVINSKY, The Rite of Spring (1913).
145. See DARIUS MILHAUD, La Crdation du Monde (1923); ARTHUR HONEGGER, Le Roi
David (1921, rev. 1923); FRANCIS POULENC, Gloria (1960).
146. See IGOR STRAVINSKY, Symphony in Three Movements (1945).
147. See SERGEY PROKOFIEV, Waltz Finale, Ballet Cinderella Act I (1944); DMITRY
SHOSTAKOVICH, Symphony No. 5 (1937).
148. NeoClassicism, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com.
149. See PIERRE CABANNE, CUBISM 12 (Anne Zweibaum et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the
approach Picasso took in creating Les Demoiselles D'Avignon); JOHN GOLDING, CUBISM: A
HISTORY AND AN ANALYSIS 1907-1914, at 10, 17 (1968) (describing the use in Cubism of a
"combination of several views of an object in a single image").
150. In Symphony of Psalms, Stravinsky looks at the key of C from different angles by
beginning the work with an E minor chord, followed by a B-flat dominant seventh chord. The
voicing of the E minor chord includes four Gs, the dominant of C. All these sonorities recur in
quick succession. What do they have to do with the key of C? Looking cubistically at C from
different tonally defining angles at the same time, the E of the E minor chord suggests the third
of C, the incomplete beginning of a major triad. A B-flat dominant seventh suggests an
incomplete reference to the key of E flat. E flat is the minor third of C. The second movement's
final cadence is an E-flat major triad with an added sixth. The added sixth here is a C. Such
quasi-cubistic techniques recur throughout the work. C major as a pure tonal triad, preceded by
its modified dominant on G, does not occur until the last few bars of the piece, completing, so to
speak, the cubistic picture of C. See STRAVINSKY, Symphony of Psalms (1939); SALZMAN, supra
note 131, at 45-52.
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After the death of Sch6nberg (1951), Stravinsky began to
explore the twelve-tone technique.151 Such post-World War II disciples
as Babbitt, Boulez, Stockhausen, Nono, and many others also wrote in
the style, but in addition to serializing pitch, or melody and harmony,
they also serialized rhythm, tempo, meter, dynamics, and various
other parameters to achieve total control.152 Strict serialism enjoyed a
shelf life of about three years, up to 1952. Its complexities were not
suited to pop music.153
In contrast to the total control movement of serialism, a style
developed known as "aleatoric."1 54 Its leader, John Cage, advocated a
music whose parameters were determined in a desultory fashion, that
is, by chance (like throwing dice-the meaning of "alea").155 Any
nonsystem of melody, harmony, texture, or even nonmusic was
accepted as valid by performers, who followed directives provided by
the composer. 156
The next major theoretical advancement (c. 1950s to the
present) may be found in tape-recorded music and music that
incorporates a computer to generate or organize sound.15 7 Identified
in French as musique concrete, tape recordings of sounds found in
living nature (human voices, bird calls, animal sounds), in natural
phenomena (waterfalls, waves crashing), or in daily life (car horns,
tapping pencils) were manipulated to expand the world of sound.158
Composers recorded these sounds at speeds faster or slower than
normal.15 9 The recordings might be played backwards or combined
with various other manipulated tape recordings.160 The practice of
151. See Joseph N. Straus, A Revisionist History of Twelve-Tone Serialism in American
Music, 2 J. SOC'Y FOR AM. Music 355-56 (2008).
152. Paul Griffiths, Serialism, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com ("[Babbitt, Boulez, Nono, and Stockhausen] and their colleagues sometimes
extended serialism to elements other than pitch, notably duration, dynamics and timbre.").
153. See id.
154. Paul Griffiths, Aleatory, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com.
155. Id. ("Chance procedures in composition have been most fully and diversely exploited
by Cage.... [Flor example, he tossed coins to decide how he should make choices from charts of
pitches, durations, intensities and other sound aspects .... ).
156. This movement parallels the theatrical movement known as theatre of the absurd
among such dramatists as Jonesco. It may blend aleatoric style with fixed compositional
techniques. It may also combine several diverse disciplines such as dance, painting, speaking,
film, video, playing or singing music, or silence. This 1960-70s style is known as mixed media or
a happening. See SALZMAN, supra note 131, at 166-68.
157. See Lloyd Ultan, Electronic Music: An American Voice, in PERSPECTIVES ON
AMERICAN MUSIC SINCE 1950, at 3, 5 (James R. Heintze ed., 1999).




VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
musique concrite might or might not be combined with
computer-generated sounds-that is, sounds not otherwise found in
the natural world.161
4. Traditional Tonality in Contemporary Popular Music
Throughout the twentieth century, the predominant style of
contemporary popular music, whether rock, folk, jazz, or
country-western, follows the tenets of traditional tonality.162 Jazz, the
most complex of the popular idioms, put its own sophisticated stamp
on the style. Its hundred-year-plus history began at the start of the
twentieth century with the blues and traverses many diverse
styles-from hot to swing to be-bop to progressive to cool and to
various forms of fusion with other styles.163 Its characteristic melodic
and harmonic idiom often includes a half-step lowering of the third,
fifth, and seventh, interchanged or combined with the corresponding
diatonic intervals.164 The roots of such tonal shading began with the
earliest descendants of American slavery, primarily in gospel singing,
chants, field calls, work songs, and eventually the blues.165 Lowered
intervals thus became widely known as the blue third, fifth, or
seventh.166 W.C. Handy's famous "St. Louis Blues" lyric, "I hate to see
that evening sun go down," incorporates many such "blue" notes.167
Though jazz or pop may incorporate any other technique
mentioned above, the relatively simple homophonic, tonal, and
rhythmically clear styles of the Common Practice Period prevail.
161. Id. at 149.
162. See AUSTIN, supra note 138, at 36 ("Meanwhile jazz transformed the popular music
of European culture. It introduced rhythmic habits from Africa which eluded notation. It
introduced new tone-colors. It left harmonic habits virtually unaffected. Debussy welcomed the
beginning of this transformation.").
163. See id. at 181-89; see also Burnett James & Jeffrey Dean, Jazz, THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com ("Although many
elements went into the making of jazz-ragtime, field hollers, work songs, spirituals, vaudeville
songs, street marches, the blues, and so on-it developed its own distinctive character by about
1900.").
164. See Mark Tucker & Travis A. Jackson, Jazz, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com ("Players began embellishing and ornamenting melodies,
inventing countermelodies, weaving arpeggiated lines into the texture and enriching diatonic
harmonies with blue notes.").
165. See generally MAUD CUNEY-HARE, NEGRO MUSICIANS AND THEIR MUSIC (1936)
(tracing the evolution of African American music).
166. Gerhard Kubik, Blue note (i), GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.oxford
musiconline.com ("It was already observed in the 1920s that blues and jazz singers, as well as
instrumentalists tend to present the 3rd and 7th, sometimes also the 5th degree in a diatonic
framework by pitch values a semitone lower, often with microtonal fluctuations.").
167. W.C. HANDY, St. Louis Blues (1914).
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Neither the rock beat, nor its rhythms, nor the jazz harmonies, nor the
primal quasi-minimalist techniques often in the forefront of pop
style(s) can disguise their traditional origins. Yet a variety of
particular elements may distinguish the myriad styles of
contemporary or earlier popular music from classical. A brief
overview of a few salient features may shed light on some of these
distinctions.
In terms of instrumentation, the predominance of piano, bass,
drums, clarinet, saxophone, trumpet, and trombone in various
combinations (known as "combos") were unheard of in traditional
classical chamber music, whose instrumentation consisted of a string
quartet, woodwind quintet, or brass quintet.168 Since the advent of
rock, electric guitar and bass are more or less standard identifiers of
style and timbre, more so than piano or acoustic guitar.169 These may
also be combined with synthesized sounds. The big band era from the
1930s onward featured an orchestra of about twenty, with saxophones,
trumpets, trombones, and a rhythm section consisting of piano, bass,
and drums.170 Alternatively, a trio of piano, bass, and drums could
function independently or in combination with a clarinet or
saxophone, as well as a singer.171
A significant quality of much popular music entails
improvisation, which results in variable renderings of melody,
harmonization, and overall arrangement.172 As far back as the
Baroque Period, improvisation was a common practice (although
168. The development of jazz explains the prevalence of these combos:
While black songs, and another of their offspring, the blues, formed a basis for many
of the instrumental techniques, others derived from brass- and wind-playing in the
aftermath of the Civil War, when the military bands broke up and left many of their
instruments lying around, battered and discarded, to be picked up by poor folk and
used in street parades, funeral processions, and the like. When jazz went indoors it
sometimes met he gentle but spirited bands of strings, piano, and drums with banjo
or guitar playing the dance music of the day.... The "classic" jazz style, born of and
in New Orleans, is essentially a linear, melodic music, played on trumpet, trombone,
and clarinet with piano, drums, banjo or guitar, and bass ....
See James & Dean, supra note 163.
169. See Tucker & Jackson, supra note 164 ("The rich, brassy textures of big bands gave
way to a leaner, more streamlined sound featuring vocals, one or two horns, electric guitar, bass
and drums.").
170. See James Lincoln Collier, Bands, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com ("The size of large bands increased steadily between 1935 and
1945, and a standard instrumentation of 4 trumpets, 4 trombones, 4 saxophones, and rhythm
section was established. Later five saxophones became common, and eventually as many as nine
or ten brass instruments were included.").
171. Id.
172. See Bruno Nettl et al., Improvisation, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www. oxfordmusiconline.com.
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within the fixed limits of the score's melody and harmony).173 In the
modern day, complex elaborations of a melody are more common in
jazz than in conventional popular music.17 4 It is common practice to
partially embellish an original theme by substituting other
harmonically or melodically valid notes.175 The great jazz singer Billie
Holiday typically embellished the final cadence of a song by singing an
intervallic second above the final note.76 Today, many singers of
various stylistic persuasions incorporate the gospel music practice of
adding "melismas" (that is, improvised elaborations of a given melody)
to sustained melodic notes, often called "rolling."177 Influenced by
Louis Armstrong and other jazz greats, singer Ella Fitzgerald used
instrumental improvisatory techniques-in other words, she imitated
the sound and style of a trumpet or saxophone as she improvised the
given song melody.78 This style dispenses with lyrics and is usually
referred to as "scat singing."'79 Improvisation is also a key element in
today's rap style, where performers often compose spontaneously and
all but dispense with melody, resulting in a loosely-measured,
quasi-incantatory, recitational vocal style supported by a driving rock
instrumental base.80
Another important element of contemporary popular music has
been the incorporation of the lively, characteristic rhythms of Latin
America.181 The various dance steps of the tango, samba, mambo,
rhumba, and cha cha, for example, are reflected in their corresponding




176. James Lincoln Collier, Billie Holiday, GROVE MUSIc ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com ("She was, however, a fine blues singer, as for example on
Fine and Mellow . . . which she built around blue thirds descending to seconds to create an
endless tension perfectly suited to the forlorn text.").
177. See Melisma, THE HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC 498 (Don Michael Randel ed., 4th
ed. 2003).
178. See NORMAN DAVID, THE ELLA FITZGERALD COMPANION 85-89 (2004); STUART
NICHOLSON, ELLA FITZGERALD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST LADY OF JAZZ 100 (1993).
179. J. Bradford Robinson, Scat Singing, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at http://www.
oxfordmusiconline.com.
180. See Rap, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR MUSIC, available at http://www.oxfordmusic
online.com ("Rap is a term adopted from the jazz tradition, where it indicates 'speaking' or
'talking."').
181. See Susan Thomas, Latin American Music, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusicontine.com ("Latin American genres and musical aesthetics have been at
the heart of worldwide innovations in jazz, dance music, and hip hop.. . .").
182. Id. ("In the second half of the 20th century, musicians in the New York scene
introduced a new Pan-Latin dance style that blended elements from Cuban son with a variety of
Latin American dance genres. . . .").
252 [Vol. 15:2:227
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF MUSIC
section, which emphasizes the dance.183 Inclusion of maracas, gourd,
and various percussive and drum types is common.
In the contemporary era, the music itself has assumed a lesser
role in popular musical presentations. Much of today's vocal pop
music incorporates a theatrical staging of the song. It may include
backup singers, dance steps, quasi-aerobic movement by any number
of backup dancers, and stage effects (including theatrical lighting and
video projections).184 This style of presentation has at least as much to
do with the visual as with the purely musical presentation. Michael
Jackson incorporated any number of these elements in his concerts,
stage shows, and videos.185 Another case in point: The work of Lady
Gaga is essentially about spectacle. This singer-songwriter ramps up
the visual aspect of her style first by making a spectacle of herself
through outrageous costuming and dance moves.186 That she sings
well in the midst of this media spectacle seems all but an
afterthought.
If the music itself is of little significance, then the significance
of legal rights in musical compositions diminishes. But the central
importance of music has not entirely disappeared and may be enjoying
a revival, thus revitalizing the importance of copyright infringement
in music cases. In sharp contrast to music as spectacle, show, or some
hybrid of performance art, the singer Adele-2012's Grammy winner
for best song, album, and record--emerges as someone who is trying to
rescue music for music's sake.187 At the 2012 Grammy Awards, Adele
stood wearing a simple black dress and singing into a microphone,
183. See id.
184. Two scholars of popular music noted the diminished focus on the music itself:
This shift happened in conjunction with a different one, a move from norms moulded
by the demands of performance, often in intimate surroundings, to techniques
designed for large-scale performance, often with the aid of amplification, or for
recording, radio or film, and at the same time shot through with the effects of
enormous changes in the resources and processes of sound production. This was
accompanied too by a gradual transition from a relative separation of song and dance
genres to a situation in which their attributes are thoroughly intertwined.
Richard Middleton & Peter Manuel, Popular Music, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE, available at
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.
185. See Michael Jackson, Thriller, YOUTUBE (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-sOnqjkJTMaA; Michael Jackson, Billie Jean, YOUTUBE (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v-ZiXLOBDo Y; Michael Jackson, Grammy Performance 1988, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 14, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-snjlNkl9PAA.
186. See Lisa Robinson, In Lady Gaga's Wake, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2012, at 50 (describing
Lady Gaga's evolution from struggling singer/songwriter to international style icon and
mesmerizing performer).
187. James C. McKinley, Jr., A Prayer, a Celebration and a Coronation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2012, at C1.
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reminding audiences that music is primarily aural, not visual.188 With
music itself becoming once again the primary focus, possible copyright
infringement becomes more apparent. With other variables stripped
away, one can discern more easily whether a song or other piece of
music closely resembles an earlier work.
As tonality developed through centuries of the most common
and effective use of chord progressions, resolutions of dissonance,
melodic and harmonic shapes, and sequences with corresponding
rhythms and accents, musicians followed a common standard. Only
the greatest, most influential, and most original composers-that is,
those composers who established and mastered what became
convention-achieved major distinctions within their respective
styles.18 9  But they achieved those distinctions all within the
gravitational pull of tonality.190
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE IN THE MUSICAL REALM
The founders of the United States contemplated federal
statutory protection for expressive works, as evidenced by their
inclusion of the Copyright and Patent Clause in the US
Constitution.191 Pursuant o that clause, the Founders gave Congress
the power to grant authors exclusive rights in their writings for
limited periods of time.192 Congress swiftly enacted the Copyright Act
of 1790, which protected books, maps, and charts from unauthorized
publication, reproduction, and sale.193  In 1831, Congress added
musical compositions to the list of protected works.194
188. Id.
189. See Popular Chord Progressions, Story Compositions, http://www.storycompositions.
com/2008/06/popular-chord-progressions.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing popular
chord progressions and harmonies, and songs that incorporate them).
190. The mastery of tonality in its earliest Classical incarnations in no way diminishes
the achievement, value, significance, or beauty of the various pop styles of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries. In fact, many Classical composers were directly influenced by the lighter
musical genres of their time, whether folk music, dance, jazz, or Gospel. See George Gershwin,
Piano Concerto in F Major (1925) (including pervasive Charleston rhythms); Darius Milhaud,
The Creation of the World (1923) (incorporating South American dance rhythms); MAURICE
RAVEL, Sonata for Violin and Piano, Second Mvt., entitled Blues (appropriating a modified blues
style).
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
192. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison) (noting the desirability both
for individuals and society of having copyright and patent protection).
193. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 5, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2006) (providing for an initial copyright term of fourteen years with a renewal term of an
additional fourteen years for books, maps, and charts)).
194. See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 15, § 4, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2006) (adding musical compositions to the list of protected works and extending the initial
[Vol. 15:2:227254
20131 COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF MUSIC 255
Throughout the nineteenth century, the only physical
embodiment of musical compositions was in the form of printed
scores.195 Phonograph records did not yet exist,196 and tapes and
compact discs were far in the future.197 Because public performance of
musical works did not infringe the copyright in the music,198
composers earned revenue mainly through the sale of printed music.199
All of that changed with the invention of piano rollS 200 and
phonograph records.201 In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., the US Supreme Court held that perforated rolls used to play
copyrighted songs on player pianos were not infringing copies of the
copyrighted musical compositions embodied in them.2 02 Because only
machines could "read" piano rolls, the rolls did not constitute the kind
of forbidden "copies" contemplated by the federal copyright statute.203
The holding in White-Smith Music carried with it a potentially
devastating impact on composers. If copies readable only by machines
did not infringe the composer's copyright, new technologies for fixing
music that could largely supplant sheet music would leave composers
with no exploitable market for their creations.
copyright term to twenty-eight years)).
195. Music Industry, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY (3d ed. 2003).
196. Thomas A. Edison received the first patent for the phonograph on Feb. 19, 1878, but
the mass production of the wax cylinders used as the recording media did not begin until after
the turn of the century. The History of the Edison Cylinder Phonograph, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammemi/edhtml/edcyldr.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
197. See Frank da Cruz, IBM 701 Tape Drive, Columbia Univ. Computing History,
http://www.columbia.edulculcomputinghistory/701-tape.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012)
(discussing the emergence of audio recordings around the time of World War II); Inventor of the
Week: James T Russell, MIT Sch. of Eng'g, http://web.mit.edulinvent/iow/russell.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012) (celebrating James Russell for inventing the digital compact disc).
198. Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1897 to provide that unauthorized public
performance of a copyrighted musical work constituted an infringement of the copyright in the
work and made the infringer liable for damages and injunctive relief. See Copyright Act of 1897,
ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006)).
199. John Stanley, Classical Music: The Great Composers and Their Masterworks, A
WORLD HISTORY OF ART, http://www.all-art.org/history700-classical musiclintr.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2012).
200. Player pianos and organs enjoyed popularity among the public from approximately
1890 to 1930. See SCHERER, supra note 8, at 38.
201. See Jon M. Garon, Music as a Business: How to Make a Career Out of It,
GALLAGHER, CALLAHAN & GARTRELL, http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/music-
career.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (discussing the popularity of player pianos and
phonographs); see also WALTER L. WELCH & LEAH BRODBECK STENZEL BURT, FROM TINFOIL TO
STEREO: THE ACOUSTIC YEARS OF THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 1877-1929 (1994) (providing an
overview of the development of the phonograph and the recording industry).
202. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
203. Id. at 17.
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Congress quickly reacted to the White-Smith Music decision by
passing the Copyright Act of 1909, which specified that the
mechanical parts used in a music-making machine to embody
copyrighted musical compositions constituted an unauthorized
reproduction of the copyrighted works.204 In addition, suspicious of
the fledgling recording industry, Congress introduced into copyright
law the first compulsory statutory license.205 Under this license,
which applied only to musical compositions, after a copyright holder
published his or her work via mechanical reproduction, any other
person could make a recording of the same work without permission,
provided that the second person paid a statutory royalty to the
copyright holder.206 Congress designed the license to increase the
dissemination of music and to prevent the record industry from using
its quasi-monopoly status to extract unduly large fees from those who
might wish to record their own versions of copyrighted music.207
When faced with copyright infringement cases involving music,
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century judges relied on their
own musical sensibilities.208 Courts rarely used expert testimony, and
juries seemed curiously absent.209 Judge Learned Hand was famous
for, among other things, his analytical dissection of musical works, in
which he did an almost note-by-note comparison of the two songs at
204. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §
110 (2006)).
205. Id. § 25(e).
206. Id.
207. Music Licensing Reform: Hearing on Reform of § 115 of the Copyright Act Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/docs/regstat062105.html. In the early days of the recording industry, three
companies dominated both t e production of record players and phonograph media (discs or
cylinders) and the recording of musical works-Columbia Phonograph Company, Edison
Phonograph Company, and Victor Talking Machine Company. See WELCH & BURT, supra note
201, at 119-20 ('The patent situation in the United States enabled the three leading companies
to keep the recording field all but closed to independent inventors or opportunistic interlopers.").
208. See Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("I rely upon such
musical sense as I have."); Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)
(adjudging the disputed works to be similar in their appeal based on the judge's own listening
abilities as a member of "the uninformed and technically untutored public"); Blume v. Spear, 30
F. 629, 631 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) (concluding without any apparent expert testimony that the
"theme or melody of the music is substantially the same in the copyrighted and the alleged
infringing pieces").
209. Compare Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923) (referring to a
music expert's affidavit in the record), with Boosey, 224 F. at 647 (determining similarity of
contested work based on the judge's lay musical opinion without the input of an expert).
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issue.210 Not surprisingly, given the substantial revenue often at
stake, the litigated cases invariably involved popular songs, as
opposed to classical works. 211
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, courts
deciding music infringement cases began to recognize the issues of
acceSS2 12 and similarity2 13 as the two key elements in such disputes.
Because independent creation is a defense to infringement,214 the
courts acknowledged that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
had at least a plausible opportunity to see or hear the plaintiffs
composition.215 In addition, where evidence of the defendant's access
to the plaintiffs work was weak, the courts allowed a plaintiff to
counterbalance a weak showing of access with compelling proof that
the two works were so similar that independent creation was
unlikely.216
In 1946, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Arnstein v. Porter synthesized the prevailing wisdom about access,
similarity, expert testimony, and the role of juries into a framework
for proving infringement that has become the model in many federal
circuits.2 17 In Arnstein v. Porter, the plaintiff, Ira Arnstein, was a
composer with some commercial success who became convinced that
any number of more successful composers were stealing his work and
making considerable profits from it.218 He instituted several copyright
210. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1936); Fred
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
211. See, e.g., Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1914) (well-known Gospel
Hymnals); Blume, 30 F. at 629 ("My Own Sweet Darling"); Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D.
Md. 1845) ("The Old Arm Chair").
212. See Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d at 275-76 ('The plaintiffs case depends upon access
and similarity. . . ."); Wilkie v. Santly Bros., 13 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
213. See Fred Fisher, 298 F. at 147; Haas, 234 F. at 107; Boosey, 224 F. at 647; Hei, 175
F. at 877.
214. See Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d at 275 ("[I1ndependent reproduction of a
copyrighted musical work is not infringement .... ).
215. See Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (noting weak
evidence of access); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 52 F. Supp. 114, 114-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (requiring access to the song in order for there to be copying, and holding that
the plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proving access).
216. See, e.g., Jewel Music Publ'g Co. v. Leo Feist, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 596, 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1945) ("Is the similarity of the two so great and so convincing that one may say that piracy exists
and is found? If the answer is in the affirmative, then of course it necessarily follows that access
may be inferred.").
217. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
218. See B. MacPaul Stanfield, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial
Similarity Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 489 (2001) ("He also
believed plagiarists had deprived him of the rewards of his talent by infringing upon the
copyrights to his compositions to their personal aggrandizement.").
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infringement suits against fellow composers in the 1930s and 1940s,2 1 9
all of which he lost, and which arguably betrayed a deteriorating
mental state.220 Although his lawsuits may be regarded as those of a
malcontent crank, they produced an important body of copyright
jurisprudence that remains influential in both music and nonmusic
cases.221
In Arnstein v. Porter, Judge Frank declared that the two
essential elements of any copyright infringement suit are copying and
unlawful appropriation.222 The plaintiff must first prove that the
defendant did not independently create his or her own work but
instead copied it from the plaintiffs.22 3 The plaintiff may demonstrate
copying through direct or circumstantial evidence.224 Direct evidence
could involve the defendant's admission of copying or perhaps
eyewitness testimony of others who observed the defendant's process
of composition.225
As direct evidence of copying is seldom available, most
commonly, a plaintiff will rely on circumstantial evidence of
copying.226 The plaintiff would show that the defendant had access to
the plaintiffs work and that a certain level of similarity exists
between the two works.227 On the issue of similarity, Judge Frank
stated that "analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony of
experts may be received to aid the trier of the facts."2 28 In other
words, experts may deconstruct a musical composition into its
component parts-melody, harmony, rhythm, texture, and formal
structure-and use their expertise to make informed comparisons
about the resemblances between the two works according to music
theory.229
219. See Porter, 154 F.2d at 464; Arnstein v. Broad. Music, 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943);
Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d at 275; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 52 F. Supp. at 114;
Arnstein v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 29 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
220. Cary Ginell, The Strange Case(s) of Ira Arnstein, Serial Litigator, Music Reports,
http://accounting.musicreports.com/smart_1icensing/content-article.php?article-id=
76 (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012).
221. Id.
222. Porter, 154 F.2d at 468.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409,
412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (defendant admitted copying the plaintiffs vocal phrase but argued that
it was not copyrightable).
226. E.g., Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999).
227. Id.
228. Porter, 154 F.2d at 468.
229. See, e.g., M. Fletcher Reynolds, Selle v. Gibb and the Forensic Analysis of
Plagiarism, http://www.musicanalyst.com/selle-v-gibb (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing the
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Once plaintiffs have established copying, they must then show
that the defendant illicitly appropriated their composition by taking
its copyrightable elements.230 On this issue, the court in Arnstein v.
Porter stated that "the question ... is whether [the] defendant took
from [the] plaintiffs works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of
lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music
is composed, that [the] defendant wrongfully appropriated something
which belongs to the plaintiff." 231 Judge Frank noted that the jury,
composed as it is of ordinary listeners, is ideally suited to make such a
determination.232 At this juncture, the court stated, juries are to
eschew analytical dissection and expert testimony.233 The goal of any
musical infringement case is to ascertain whether the defendant
copied the protectable elements of the plaintiffs composition so that
the defendant's song essentially supersedes the demand for the
plaintiffs.234 If the defendant's song is substantially similar to the
plaintiffs, then the average lay listener (that is, the consuming public)
might be inclined to purchase the former, particularly if it were
available at a lower price than the latter.235
Because of the inherent subjectivity of discerning substantial
similarity between two musical works, Judge Frank expressed his
disapproval of summary judgment in music infringement cases.236 He
believed that the jury accurately reflected the listening capacities of
the average lay listener and that judges should not substitute their
inevitably idiosyncratic perception of the two compositions in
dispute.237 Even though the plaintiffs story in Arnstein v. Porter
contained its improbable and "fantastic" portions, the court could not
expert analysis of pitch, rhythm, and melody to determine similarity between two compositions
in Selle v. Gibb).
230. Porter, 154 F.2d at 468.
231. Id. at 473.
232. Id.
233. Id. Curiously, however, Judge Frank suggested that experts may sometimes be
employed at the illicit appropriation stage to "aid the jury in reaching its conclusion as to the
responses of [lay] audiences." Id. Although it is not entirely clear what Judge Frank meant by
this statement, it may be inferred that the experts may point out to the jury resemblances that
flow not from the musical content of the two pieces but from the manner in which they are
played, sung, or otherwise presented. See id.
234. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1993) (describing, in
the context of fair use, whether a song meant to be a parody had effectively fulfilled the demand
of the original).
235. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4-5 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing
the effect of price on product substitution).
236. See Porter, 154 F.2d at 471.
237. See id. at 473 ("Indeed, even if there were to be a trial before a judge, it would be
desirable (although not necessary) for him to summon an advisory jury on this question.").
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rule out the possibility that the defendant had plagiarized from the
plaintiffs songs.238 Once in a great while, summary judgment might
be appropriate, and Judge Frank famously posed the hypothetical in
which "Ravel's 'Bolero' or Shostakovitch's 'Fifth Symphony' [was]
alleged to infringe 'When Irish Eyes are Smiling."' 239 In that situation,
the profound musical differences among the three compositions would
preclude any possibility of copyright infringement.24 0
The requisite elements of a copyright infringement suit, as
outlined in Arnstein v. Porter, have remained virtually unaltered to
this day, particularly in the Second Circuit.241 The Ninth Circuit
separately developed its own formula for infringement actions based
on an initial extrinsic analysis of the ideas of the two works followed
by an intrinsic analysis based on the reactions of the ordinary lay
observer.242 Although the Ninth Circuit's terminology does not track
Arnstein v. Porter, the notion of formally dissecting and comparing the
disputed works with the aid of expert testimony and then having the
trier of fact adjudge the similarity between them to the average lay
person is common to both circuits.243
The Ninth Circuit first outlined its approach for assessing
copyright infringement in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions,
238. See id. at 469.
239. Id. at 473.
240. It is highly unlikely that composers of such high stature as Ravel and Shostakovitch
would appropriate "When Irish Eyes are Smiling"-particularly without citing the borrowing or
appropriation of the same. Any allegation of such appropriation begs at least two major
questions: Why would Ravel, a FrenchlSpanish composer, reference or even want to reference an
Irish tune (with no otherwise-programmatic usage) in a quasi-nationalistic Spanish dance, the
Bolero? Why would Shostakovitch, a Russian composer criticized by the Communist Central
Committee as being too decadently Western (in his use of dissonance, formal complexity and
overly esoteric style) and trying to get back into the good graces of the Stalinist regime in 1937,
reference an Irish tune in his Fifth Symphony-a work that is clearly an overt paean to
quasi-political Bolshevik Russian culture, particularly in its grand triumphant finale ending in D
major? In any case, neither work in any way resembles, let alone suggests, infringement of the
basic musical materials. No theme, no harmony, no formal element, and no musical analysis
even vaguely suggests any such connection to the Irish tune.
241. Boone v. Jackson, 206 Fed. Appx. 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2006); Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d
882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1988); Walker v.
Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986); Thayil v. Fox Corp., No. 11 Civ. 4791 (SAS),
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13669, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2012). But the Arnstein v. Porter court's
skittishness about granting summary judgment in copyright infringement cases has been
criticized and largely supplanted by a more flexible approach. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258 n.5 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The days of Arnstein v. Porter [regarding
summary judgment] . . . are behind us.").
242. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006), as
recognized in Dream Games of Arizona, Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009).
243. Compare Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164, with Porter, 154 F.2d at 468.
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Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.2 4 4 Under Krofft's first step, the "extrinsic
test," the trier of fact must compare the plaintiffs and defendant's
works to determine the similarity of their ideas-in other words, the
basic concept or theme behind the works.2 4 5 As in the Second Circuit's
approach, the trier of fact engages in analytical dissection of both
works and relies on expert testimony.246  If the trier of fact finds
substantial similarity of ideas, it then moves to the second step, the
"intrinsic test," during which it examines the works as an ordinary
observer without analytic dissection or use of expert testimony.247
During this process, the trier of fact judges whether the two works
have "substantial similarity in expressions .. . depending on the
response of the ordinary reasonable person."24 8
Over time, the Ninth Circuit's approach to infringement has
moved closer to that of the Second Circuit, especially with respect to
the extrinsic test.24 9 Recent Ninth Circuit decisions have allowed the
trier of fact to determine substantial similarity of more than merely
the "ideas" of the two works. 2 5 0  Extrinsic-test criteria for literary
works, for example, include plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace,
sequence of events, and characters.251 But the Ninth Circuit has not
expressly delineated the extrinsic elements of musical works, making
the test difficult for the lower courts to apply.2 5 2 Other circuits have
244. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164-65; see also Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446,
1448-49 (9th Cir. 1989); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989).
245. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164 ("The determination of whether there is substantial
similarity in ideas may often be a simple one. Returning to the example of the nude statue, the
idea there embodied is a simple one-a plaster recreation of a nude human figure. A statue of a
horse or a painting of a nude would not embody this idea and therefore could not infringe.").
246. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
247. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
248. Id. Although Krofft also referenced "the 'total concept and feel"' standard of
comparison, id. at 1167 (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970)), later Ninth Circuit cases incorporated more explicitly the notion of comparing
"the 'total look and feel of the works"' as part of the intrinsic test, see Benay v. Warner Bros.
Entm't, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d
815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The 'intrinsic test' is a subjective comparison that focuses on 'whether
the ordinary, reasonable audience' would find the works substantially similar in the 'total
concept and feel of the works."')).
249. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03
[El [3] [b] [ii] (2012) (discussing the evolution of the extrinsic test in the Ninth Circuit).
250. See id. § 13.03 [E][3][b] (discussing the evolution of the Ninth Circuit standard for
substantial similarity).
251. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1990); Litchfield v. Spielberg,
736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984).
252. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In analyzing musical
compositions under the extrinsic test, we have never announced a uniform set of factors to be
used. We will not do so now.").
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adopted either the Second or Ninth Circuit approach, some with their
own modifications.2 5 3
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN MUSIC INFRINGEMENT CASES: ACCESS,
SUBCONSCIOUS COPYING, INDEPENDENT CREATION, AND THE USE OF
EXPERTS
Although the approach for proving copyright infringement first
set forth fully in Arnstein v. Porter has become one of the standard
frameworks for analyzing plagiarism cases involving all types of
artistic creations, it has posed some thorny problems in disputes over
musical compositions. Because music is the only creative work that
appeals primarily to the ear rather than the eye, consumers absorb,
appreciate, and retain music differently from plays, novels, visual art,
and architectural works.254 Studies have suggested that there is a
particular area of the brain that comprehends and stores musical
information.255  In addition, the conventional tonal practices of
Western music limit the combinations of notes that will sound
pleasing or acceptable to the Western listener.256 Finally, particular
popular musical styles-for example, country-western, hip hop, rock,
and blues-will dictate certain rhythms and musical motives.25 7
Hence, expectations of the genre will further restrict the compositional
choices.
253. See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying its own test);
Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Second Circuit approach);
Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Second Circuit approach); Taylor
Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 2005) (utilizing Ninth Circuit
approach); Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 942-943 (10th Cir. 2002) (applying a
version of the Second Circuit approach); Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th
Cir. 1990) (utilizing Ninth Circuit approach); Peters v. West, 776 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(applying distinctive Seventh Circuit standard).
254. Obviously, plays, movies, and literary works that are performed have an aural as
well as a visual element.
255. See ELENA MANNES, THE POWER OF MUSIC: PIONEERING DISCOVERIES IN THE NEW
SCIENCE OF SONG 27-39 (2011) (describing various neuroscientific studies of music and the brain,
including one that identified the rostromedial pre-frontal cortex as the primary area of the brain
stimulated when one listens to music).
256. Since the time of the mathematician and philosopher Pythagoras in ancient Greece,
it has been known that certain mathematical relationships dictate the consonance or dissonance
of music. STUART ISACOFF, TEMPERAMENT: How Music BECAME A BATTLEGROUND FOR THE
GREAT MINDS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 26-42 (2003). For example, two tones vibrating at
speeds in a 2:1 ratio will produce a sound most agreeable to the human ear; even a slight
deviation from that ratio will be perceived as "grating and sour rather than placid." Id. at 35.
257. See DONALD J. GROUT & CLAUDE V. PALISCA, A HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSIC 752-53
(6th ed. 2001) (describing characteristics of rock, rhythm-and-blues, and country music).
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In contrast to music, other creative works penetrate the human
brain primarily through the optic system. Literary works, in
particular, provide the opportunity for a measured perusal by the
reader; in other words, readers dictate the pace at which they absorb
the written page. With music, the composer and the performer
present the listener with a finished composition to be played at a
particular tempo.258 Furthermore, because an artist has an enormous
range of creative options in constructing a literary or dramatic work or
a work of visual art or architecture, it is highly unlikely that one work
will resemble another. A painter has literally hundreds of colors to
choose from and dozens of media in which to render a work. A
novelist has tens of thousands of words to use in an innumerable
variety of formulations.2 59
These peculiar characteristics of music bear significantly on
certain important issues surrounding copyright infringement-in
particular, access, subconscious copying, independent creation, and
the use of expert testimony in litigation. Courts should be aware of
music's unique qualities when shaping the legal doctrine governing
infringement disputes to ensure that plaintiff composers can
adequately protect themselves from plagiarism and defendant
composers can fend off unjustified attacks on their authorial integrity.
A. Access to the Plaintiff's Composition
Under the first prong of the Arnstein v. Porter approach for
proving copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant copied from the plaintiffs work.260 Direct evidence of
copying, the courts rightly note, is rarely available.261 Hardly ever do
eyewitnesses come forward to testify that they observed the defendant
258. See ARNOLD SCHOENBERG, THE MUSICAL IDEA AND THE LOGIC, TECHNIQUE, AND ART
OF ITS PRESENTATION 111 (Patricia Carpenter & Severine Neff eds. & trans., 1995) ("Since music
is intended (primarily) for listening (and only secondarily for reading) and through its tempo so
determines the course of ideas and problems that a protracted lingering over a misunderstood
idea becomes impossible . . . every idea must be presented so that the listener's power of
comprehension can follow it.").
259. Although it has long been acknowledged that there are only so many distinct
plotlines in Western literature, an author has an almost unending variety of ways in which to
develop and express them.
260. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d
896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Proof of copying is crucial to any claim of copyright infringement
because no matter how similar the two works may be (even to the point of identity), if the
defendant did not copy the accused work, there is no infringement.").
261. JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Jackson,
84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1995); Tisi v.
Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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composer lifting passages from the plaintiffs work and dropping them
into the defendant's own composition, and it is highly unusual for a
defendant to admit copying.262  Therefore, most plaintiffs must
establish copying through circumstantial evidence, by which they
show that the defendant had access to their work and that there is
probative similarity between the disputed works.263  Probative
similarity between the two works means that the defendant's work
contains similarities to the plaintiffs work that can be explained only
by copying as opposed to common use of public domain materials or
coincidence.264  Plaintiffs typically establish probative similarity
through the testimony of experts who dissect the two works and seek
to determine whether the works are similar in their musical
construction.26 5 In addition, many courts apply an inverse-ratio rule
to the relationship between access and probative similarity-with a
strong showing of access, a weaker showing of similarity will suffice,
and vice versa.266
Generally, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had
access to the plaintiffs work to establish copying in the absence of
direct evidence.267 Where musical works are involved, plaintiffs
ordinarily rely on either a "chain-of-events" theory or a
wide-dissemination theory to establish access.268  Under the
"chain-of-events" theory, plaintiffs attempt to prove that their music
as embodied in some medium (printed score, digital format, cassette
tape, or compact disc) was given to someone and then passed through
262. Occasionally, defendants admit copying the plaintiffs work but then argue that the
copying was lawful under the de minimis doctrine, fair use, or some other defense. See, e.g.,
Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 288 n.2 (D.N.J. 1993) (noting that "copying is
admitted at the outset" in sampling cases).
263. E.g., Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2007).
264. For the seminal article on probative similarity, see Alan Latman, 'Probative
Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).
265. Although several elements, such as melody, harmony, rhythm, tempo, and texture,
contribute to a finished musical product, the cases and the experts tend to emphasize similarities
in melody as the most probative of copying. See Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir.
2005); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004); Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d
1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002).
266. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000); Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1990); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548, 553-54 (2d Cir. 1984).
267. E.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 355 (D.
Mass 1993).
268. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984); Peters v. West, 776 F. Supp. 2d
742, 748 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
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one or more hands to reach the allegedly infringing defendant.269 The
bare possibility of access, however, will not suffice, nor will the
suggestion of access through speculation or conjecture.2 70
Where the plaintiffs have submitted their works to music
publishers and record labels, they often can satisfy the chain-of-events
theory and establish a reasonable possibility of access through the
corporate-receipt doctrine. Under this doctrine, if the defendant is a
corporation, the receipt of the plaintiffs work by one of the defendant's
employees constitutes receipt by the employee who actually composed
the accused work, so long as there is some connection between the two
employees.271  Courts and commentators variously define this
relationship as "physical propinquity,"272 a "nexus," a "connection," or
"crossed paths."2 73 Merely showing that the corporation received the
plaintiffs work is not enough to establish access.274 There must be
some reasonable possibility that the plaintiffs composition found its
way into the defending composer's hands.
Apart from a "chain-of-events" theory, plaintiffs can attempt to
show that defendants had the necessary access through a theory of
widespread dissemination. Traditionally, plaintiffs employing this
theory would demonstrate that their musical works were widely
distributed through extensive radio or television airplay or record
sales.2 7 5  In the contemporary context, courts have added
dissemination via the Internet to the mix, making practically any
269. Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 482 (noting that access is shown where "a
particular chain of events is established between the plaintiffs work and the defendant's access
to that work (such as through dealings with a publisher or record company). . . .").
270. Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 153 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Reasoning that amounts to
nothing more than a 'tortuous chain of hypothetical transmittals' is insufficient to infer access."
(quoting Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 2001))).
271. See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2009); Moore v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1992); Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
272. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[A] (2010).
273. Lee S. Brenner & Allison S. Rohrer, The Bare Corporate Receipt Doctrine, 24-WTR
COMM. LAW. 3 (2007).
274. Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Bare corporate
receipt . . . without any allegation of a nexus between the recipients and the alleged infringers, is
insufficient to raise a triable issue of access."); see also Stacy Brown, The Corporate Receipt
Conundrum: Establishing Access in Copyright Infringement Actions, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1409,
1411-12 (1993) ("[C]ourts have recently held that the plaintiff must provide additional evidence
showing a relationship between the employee who received the submission at the company and
the employee who allegedly copied it.").
275. See Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 137 (2d Cir. 1996); ABKCO Music, Inc. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc.,
988 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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piece of music available (legally or illegally) with a mouse click.2 76
Because access is predicated upon the defendant's having a
"reasonable opportunity" to see or hear the plaintiffs work, an alleged
infringer would have almost presumptive access to music that is
readily available on the Internet.277
Despite their best efforts, however, some plaintiffs in copyright
infringement cases cannot establish access as a factual matter. In
other words, they cannot present satisfactory proof that the defendant
saw or heard the plaintiffs work through a chain of custody or
through widespread dissemination.27 8 In such situations, the courts
have allowed striking similarity between the two works to serve as a
substitute for access or as an inferential basis for access.279 The
majority of courts hold that striking similarity is evidence of access
but that plaintiffs still must prove that the defendant had access to
their work.280 A minority of courts, however, suggest that striking
similarity is presumptive proof of access.281 In other words, if the two
works are so similar that it is virtually impossible for the defendant to
have created his or her work without copying from the plaintiff, then
the defendant obviously had the opportunity to view and copy the
plaintiffs work.
276. See David Nimmer, Access Denied, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 769, 781-82 (cautioning that
widespread Internet dissemination of works may effectively eliminate the "safeguard of access"
and that, as a result, "a witch's brew threatens to swallow traditional copyright safeguards").
277. See Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access
Requirement Lost Its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 312 (1999) ("[T]he access
requirement has lost much of its force in light of the rise of Internet use, in particular, digital
music downloading.").
278. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1984) ('The greatest difficulty perhaps
arises when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate any direct link between the complaining work and
the defendant but the work has been so widely disseminated that it is not unreasonable to infer
that the defendant might have had access to it.").
279. Id. ("Thus, although proof of striking similarity may permit an inference of access,
the plaintiff must still meet some minimum threshold of proof which demonstrates that the
inference of access is reasonable.").
280. See id. at 901 ("[S]triking similarity is just one piece of circumstantial evidence
tending to show access and must not be considered in isolation; it must be considered together
with other types of circumstantial evidence relating to access."); Stewart v. Wachowski, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
281. See Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2009) ("A lesser showing of access (or
even no showing at all) will suffice where the works are 'striking[ly]' similar, strongly suggesting
that copying occurred."); Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001) ("In this court,
'[i]f the two works are so strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility of independent creation,
'copying' may be proved without a showing of access."'); Ferguson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d
111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Even without proof of access, plaintiff could still make out her case if
she showed that the two works were not just substantially similar, but were so strikingly similar
as to preclude the possibility of independent creation.").
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A closer comparison of the majority and minority rules
regarding access and striking similarity, however, reveals that the
differences between them are less meaningful than at first glance.
One court applying the majority rule stated that "striking similarity is
one way to demonstrate access."2 8 2 In the same vein, a court applying
the minority rule declared that the plaintiff "must produce evidence of
access, all right, but ... a similarity that is so close as to be highly
unlikely to have been an accident of independent creation is evidence
of access."28 3  At some point then, the majority and minority
approaches appear to converge. Both approaches apparently concede
that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had access to the
plaintiffs work but may use striking similarity between the two works
as the only evidence of access.284
B. Subconscious Copying and Independent Creation
Closely related to the issue of access is the concept of
subconscious copying. Independent creation is a defense to copyright
infringement; even if defendants produce a work identical to that of
plaintiffs, if they did so autonomously, without copying from the
plaintiffs work, there is no actionable infringement.2 85  Ordinarily,
infringing defendants will be well aware that they are purloining
material from the plaintiffs work. In some instances, defendants may
mistakenly believe that they have the legal right to appropriate some
or all of the plaintiffs creation-for example, if they think that the
plaintiffs work has passed into the public domain or that the elements
that they are borrowing are unprotectable.286 But even in these
circumstances, the defendants are undoubtedly aware that they are
borrowing from someone else.
In a few cases, however, courts in copyright infringement cases
have identified the phenomenon of subconscious copying and used it
as a basis for finding liability. As early as 1924, in Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
282. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 228 F.3d 489, 494 (4th Cir. 2000).
283. Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997).
284. See Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 156 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing with seeming
approval the majority rule on access stated in Selle v. Gibb despite being a minority rule court);
Stewart, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (discussing the split among the circuits on "striking
similarity").
285. See Selle, 741 F.2d at 904; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d
Cir. 1930).
286. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 343-44, 364 (1991)
(holding the material in a telephone directory unprotectable where the defendant, in creating its
regional directory, purposely copied entries from the plaintiffs local directory, undoubtedly
believing the material was unprotectable).
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Dillingham, Judge Learned Hand observed that the defendant
composer had probably subconsciously copied the ostinato of his
composition from the plaintiffs work.2 87 Given the apparent recent
success of the plaintiffs song, Judge Hand believed it likely that the
defendant, himself a successful composer, had heard the plaintiffs
work, stored the ostinato accompaniment in his memory, and later
inadvertently used it in his own composition.288 The defendant denied
having consciously borrowed the ostinato from the plaintiffs song, and
Judge Hand found his denials credible.289 Because of the virtual
identity of the two accompanimental figures and the absence of a
common prior source, however, the court felt constrained to find
infringement.290 The defendant's "innocence" or lack of willful intent
can certainly shield him from enhanced damages but has no bearing
on the question of whether he unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs
original expression.291
Almost sixty years later, the Second Circuit reiterated that
subconscious copying constitutes copyright infringement.2 9 2  In
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., former Beatle George
Harrison was accused of infringing the plaintiffs song "He's So Fine"
in the creation of his song "My Sweet Lord." 2 93 In light of the
popularity and wide distribution of the plaintiffs song and the telling
similarities between the melodies and structures of the two works, the
court upheld the lower court's finding of infringement.2 94 Although
admitting that he had heard the plaintiffs song at some time in the
past,295 Harrison testified extensively about his autonomous process of
composition and his lack of reliance on any other musical works.296
287. Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 152. Judge Hand thought that the dispute was "'a trivial pother' ... a mere
point of honor, of scarcely more than irritation, involving no substantial interest." Id. (citing
Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83, 95 (2d Cir. 1922) (Hough, J.,
dissenting)).
291. Id. at 148; see also N. Music Corp. v. Pacemaker Music Co., No. 64 Civ. 1956, 1965
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1965) ("[Iff copying did in fact occur; [sic] it cannot
be defended on the ground that it was done unconsciously and without intent to appropriate
plaintiffs work.").
292. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983).
293. Id. at 990.
294. Id. at 999.
295. "He's So Fine" was released in 1963 and became an instant hit in both the United
States and the United Kingdom. Id. at 997-98. Harrison recalled hearing the song around the
time of its release. He composed "My Sweet Lord" six years later. Id.
296. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (setting forth portions of Harrison's testimony in which he described working
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But his testimony was for naught, as the district court found that
Harrison had unwittingly copied the melody for his song from the
plaintiffs melody.297
Almost two decades later, the Ninth Circuit in Three Boys
Music Corp. v. Bolton affirmed a jury verdict against the defendant
singer-songwriter Michael Bolton in favor of the rights holder to the
song, "Love Is a Wonderful Thing," composed by the Isley Brothers in
1964.298 Bolton asserted that he had independently composed his
song, also entitled "Love Is a Wonderful Thing," in 1990.299 The court
acknowledged that the defendant must have subconsciously, rather
than intentionally, relied on the Isley Brothers' song, given the
similarities between the two works.300 Nonetheless, the court affirmed
the defendant's liability, holding that deliberate copying is not
required for a finding of infringement.3 0 1
In contrast to ABKCO Music, access in Three Boys Music was
much more tenuous, and the similarities between the two songs not as
great. In fact, Bolton had no recollection of having heard the
plaintiffs song, which was not released on compact disc until 1991,
one year after Bolton composed his song.3 0 2 The jury's finding of
access was apparently predicated on radio and television airplay in
the mid-1960s when Bolton was a teenager and on Bolton's admitted
longstanding admiration of the Isley Brothers and their music.303
Although Bolton's exposure to the plaintiffs song was twenty-five
years before he wrote his own song, the court ruled that the jury was
entitled to find that he copied from the plaintiff.304
Judicial recognition of subconscious copying as the basis for
finding infringement seems predicated on the notion that copying is
copying, whether done intentionally or innocently. But, one might
argue, the composition process is not so neatly cabined. Earlier works
inevitably influence all creators of artistic works. In the musical
realm, where the defendant composers might have heard many
different musical phrases over a period of many years and stored them
with US gospel singer Billy Preston and others to develop the music and lyrics for 'My Sweet
Lord").
297. Id. at 180.
298. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 480, 489 (9th Cir. 2000). The jury
awarded the plaintiff $5.4 million in damages. Id. at 480.
299. Id. at 481, 486. Bolton's song became a pop hit in 1991 and finished the year at
number forty-nine on Billboard's end-of-the-year pop chart. Id.
300. Id. at 482-83.
301. See id. at 486.
302. Id. at 487.
303. Id. at 483-84.
304. Id. at 486.
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in their brains, it is debatable whether they are engaged in
"independent" creation when putting down notes on the page or
working up a piece on a keyboard. All Western musical compositions
draw to a large extent on earlier works, are grounded in a common
vocabulary, and must sound pleasing or acceptable to the human ear,
at least to some degree. Because all composers work in this fashion,
some element of subconscious copying may exist in almost all works.305
One interesting aspect of the subconscious copying cases is that those
collaborating with any of these defendants in composing, arranging,
performing, and producing the disputed musical work apparently did
not point out to the defendant that his work might infringe an earlier
piece. If the similarity was so palpable, why would no one have
spoken up before the defendant's composition was published and
attacked?
Independent creation has been a defense to copyright
infringement since at least the early twentieth century. In 1910,
Judge Learned Hand suggested that the defendant composer of a song
substantially similar to the plaintiffs could be found liable for
copyright infringement even though he had never heard the plaintiffs
composition.306 Judge Hand's comment implied that novelty, not
originality, was the touchstone of copyright protection.307 But by 1936,
Judge Hand had changed his opinion and embraced independent
creation as a defense to infringement.3 08  Although judges have
occasionally sought to replow the novelty furrow,309 the case law still
recognizes originality as the essence of protectable expression.310
Composers sitting alone in their studios drawing upon their own
training and imagination theoretically can produce an original work
that not only is copyrightable, but will also not infringe an identical
305. In one interesting case, the defendant successfully proffered the independent
creation defense by providing witnesses who observed him spontaneously creating the allegedly
plagiarized song in the middle of a church service. Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228,
1233-34 (11th Cir. 2002). Although there was some evidence of access (though a bit weak), the
court never really considered the possibility that the defendant in his "spontaneous" creation was
subconsciously copying from the plaintiffs earlier song, which was almost identical to the
defendant's. See id.
306. Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
307. See id.
308. Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 275 (2d Cir. 1936)
("[Independent reproduction of a copyrighted musical work is not infringement; nothing short of
plagiarism will serve.").
309. See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 893 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing for use
of novelty standard for both copyrights and patents).
310. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("The sine
qua non of copyright is originality."); Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 80 (2d
Cir. 2004); Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003).
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work created earlier by another. The inherent tension between
subconscious copying and independent creation thus flows from the
difficulty of determining how truly independent composers' efforts are
when their minds are filled with snatches and phrases of (in some
cases) hundreds of earlier works and when some of those shorter or
longer fragments may be imported into a theoretically "new" work.
C. The Use of Experts in Music Infringement Litigation
The use of expert testimony in music infringement litigation
over time tracks a pendulum swing more than a straight line. As
early as the mid-nineteenth century, US courts recognized the
difficulties confronting lay judges and juries in determining whether
two musical works were substantially similar in a musicological
sense.311 Courts referenced the need to incorporate expert opinions
into the litigation process.312 Music experts could assist in dissecting
the two musical compositions and ascertaining whether the melodic,
harmonic, and rhythmic elements suggested copying or independent
creation.313 They could also place the compositions in a historical
context and describe their public domain antecedents.314
But by the early twentieth century, references to expert
testimony in music infringement cases were rare, and several judges
seemingly took pride in relying on their own musical sensibilities to
determine plagiarism.315 Because infringement turned on whether the
311. Several judicial opinions reveal a marked lack of understanding by judges of the
fundamentals of music. See, e.g., N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (incorrectly equating rhythm and tempo); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham,
298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (erroneously describing the accompaniments in the disputed
works as "ostinato"); Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (incorrectly
referring to ragtime as syncopated "time" as opposed to rhythm); Hein, 175 F. at 876
(erroneously asserting that the disputed works were in minor as opposed to major keys).
312. See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923) (referring to an
expert's analysis of the disputed works); Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910, 914 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850)
("Persons of skill and experience in the art must be called in to assist in the determination of the
question.").
313. See Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music
Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 145-46 (1988) ("Without the benefit of
expert analysis and dissection, the factfinder is ill-equipped to distinguish [similarities that
relate to copyrightable material from those that result from a common source or common musical
form instead of copying].").
314. See Reply Decl. of Lawrence Ferrara, Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV 08-2170 CAS
(CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (No. 242-9) (discussing the
historical antecedents of the disputed works).
315. Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc. 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("I rely upon such musical
sense as I have."); Boosey, 224 F. at 647 (adjudging the disputed works to be similar in their
appeal based on the judge's own listening abilities as a member of "the uninformed and
technically untutored public"); Blume v. Spear, 30 F. 629, 631 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) (concluding
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two musical works were substantially similar to the ear of the average
lay listener, judges in bench trials apparently believed that their ears
were as good, if not better, than those of ordinary listeners.316 If two
songs sound alike, they must be alike for infringement purposes,
assuming that the defendants did not independently create their
compositions.317
By the time the Second Circuit corralled the disparate parts of
infringement analysis and put forward a coherent analytical
framework in Arnstein v. Porter in 1946, the use of experts had
become essential. The "copying" phase of the Arnstein v. Porter
framework required a determination of whether the defendant had
"copied" his or her work from the plaintiffs, which in turn
necessitated a showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs
work and that the two works were probatively similar.318 Both parties
tended to use experts to testify as to whether the similarities between
the two compositions were indicative of copying-that is, whether
from a musicological standpoint, the similarities were unlikely to have
occurred by chance or by the defendant's reliance on common public
domain source material.319 If the defense's expert testimony that the
works lacked probative similarity was convincing, then presumably
the trier of fact would not need to reach the "unlawful appropriation"
issue. Without probative similarity, copying could not exist, and thus,
the unlawful appropriation issue became moot.32 0 In fact, if the
disputed works were obviously different in their melody, harmony,
rhythm, and form, it would be possible to resolve some cases at the
summary judgment stage, avoiding a trial on the merits.321
But many courts were reluctant to resolve music infringement
disputes at the summary judgment phase. Both parties usually
introduced expert testimony that diverged dramatically, depending on
without any apparent expert testimony that the "theme or melody of the music is substantially
the same in the copyrighted and the alleged infringing pieces.").
316. Boosey, 224 F. at 647.
317. Blume, 30 F. at 631 ("The theme or melody of the music is substantially the same in
the copyrighted and the alleged infringing pieces.... There are variations, but they are so placed
as to indicate that the former was taken deliberately, rather than that the latter was a new
piece.").
318. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
319. See Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946); Life Music,
Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653, 655-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
320. Jones v. Supreme Music Corp., 101 F. Supp. 989, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ("Of course, if
there are no similarities no amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying.").
321. See, e.g., Currin v. Arista Records, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 286, 291 (D. Conn. 2010)
(granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment and finding that "no reasonable trier of
fact could find the works substantially similar").
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which party employed the expert.322 Thus, the requirement for
summary judgment that the case present no genuine issue of material
fact was infrequently satisfied.323 In addition, judges had an obvious
love-hate relationship with the experts. They recognized the value of
the specialized and knowledgeable perspective that experts
provided,324 while at the same time discounting it.325 The expert
opinions tended to cancel each other out, and given most experts'
comparable qualifications, it was difficult to weigh one side's expert
testimony more heavily than the other's. Some courts also thought
that a party could buy any particular music historian's or analyst's
"expert" opinion for a price.326
Scholarly opinion on the value of experts has also traversed a
wide arc. Some scholars have viewed experts as invaluable in
identifying the copyrightable components of music compositions by
means of analytical dissection.327  Under this view, experts are
essential at both the probative-similarity and substantial-similarity
322. E.g., Allen v. Walt Disney Prods., 41 F. Supp. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ('The
opinions of these men of music are so widely apart that it is impossible to reconcile them.").
323. See, e.g., Lessem v. Taylor, 766 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that
the differing opinions of the two sides' experts precluded summary judgment).
324. See Velez v. Sony Discos, No. 05 Civ. 0615 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5495, at
*18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2007) ("[E]xpert testimony in a music plagiarism case such as this, which
does not concern song lyrics but rather the underlying elements of melody, rhythm, harmony,
and structure, may be necessary to resolve claims of copyright infringement."); Tisi v. Patrick, 97
F. Supp. 2d 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (crediting the defendant's expert with helping the court to
overcome its "unfamiliarity" with the rock music genre).
325. See, e.g., Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1953) (affirming the trial
court's refusal to allow the plaintiffs expert to testify as to whether two works could have been
independently created); Walters v. Shari Music Publ'g Corp., 185 F. Supp. 408, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (minimizing the importance of expert testimony and stating that "the impression of
substantial identity made upon the untrained ear is even more convincing"); Supreme Records,
Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 912 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (declining "to resolve the
different interpretations by musically trained listeners," i.e., experts, and instead attempting to
approach the issue of similarity by placing "himself," i.e., the judge, in the position of the average
lay listener).
326. See Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 686, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("[T]he musical
experts for each side demonstrated, in their zealous partisanship, the doubtful function of the
expert as an aid to the court in this class of litigation.").
327. See J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 434 (2004) ("[l]t would be difficult to
overstate the importance of experts in music copyright litigation."); Alice J. Kim, Expert
Testimony and Substantial Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement
Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 122 (1995) (arguing that expert testimony should be
allowed throughout trial in copyright infringement cases involving musical works); Jeffrey
Cadwell, Comment, Expert Testimony, Scnes A Faire, and Tonal Music: A (Not So) New Test for
Infringement, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 137, 168 (2005) ("When making a case regarding
similarity, expert testimony is crucial to demonstrate similarities between the work of the
plaintiff and the work of the defendant.").
2013] 273
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
stages of the Arnstein v. Porter analysis.32 8  Because of their
musicological training, these experts can identify whether both
copying and improper appropriation have occurred far more accurately
than a lay judge or jury. Because of their general lack of musical
training, judges and juries are likely to be both overinclusive and
underinclusive in their assessment of infringement.3 2 9 They may
incorrectly find two works to be substantially similar based on the
manner in which they are performed and on certain qualities
characteristic of a particular genre-for instance, country-western,
blues, or hip hop. In fact, the defendant may not have borrowed at all
from the plaintiffs work. On the other hand, the manner of
performance and the arrangement of material may mask underlying
similarities indicative of plagiarism. The two works may not sound
very much alike to the trier of fact, even though they are musically
very similar.
Other scholars, however, have argued that the lay trier of fact
is ideally suited to determine whether copying has occurred.330 Music
analysts and theorists may be trapped by the wealth and subtlety of
their own expertise in trying to determine similarities between two
works. The ultimate standard under copyright law should be whether
the defendant has interfered with the plaintiffs market by copying the
plaintiffs work. If copying has occurred to some degree but most lay
listeners would not find the two works substantially similar, then
presumably the defendant's work is not a substitute for the plaintiffs.
In other words, consumers would not purchase the defendant's work
in lieu of the plaintiffs. Assuming both works are in the same genre
of music, listeners partial to that genre might easily purchase both
works. If they buy only one work, their decision might be based not on
the nature of the musical composition, but on other factors, such as
the celebrity of the artist performing the work, the quality of the
performance, or their familiarity with the work from airplay. Thus,
because of the market-substitution theory underlying copyright law,
these scholars view the judge or jury as especially suited to apply the
ordinary lay listener standard in music infringement cases.
328. See Kim, supra note 327, at 125 ("[M]usic's complexity demands the assistance of
experts throughout the infringement analysis.").
329. Id. at 128.
330. See Paul M. Grinvalsky, Comment, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the
Role of the Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 397
(1992) (arguing, however, that juries should be composed of the intended audience for the works);
Austin Padgett, Note, The Rhetoric of Predictability: Reclaiming the Lay Ear in Music Copyright
Infringement Litigation, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 146-49 (2008) ("Courts should continue to employ
the Arnstein lay listener inquiry in its purest form.").
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IV. MUSIC INFRINGEMENT: A CASE STUDY
As the discussion above suggests, one can approach copyright
infringement in music cases, and in particular the issues of probative,
substantial, and striking similarity between two works, from both a
legal and a musicological point of view. But inevitably, technical
musical analysis heavily influences the legal approach, especially
when courts and juries must determine whether the defendant copied
from the plaintiffs musical composition. This Part examines the
question of music infringement within a musicological framework and
presents a case study from a recent copyright infringement case in
which the court may have gone down the wrong path, either in whole
or in part. In general, the apparent errors committed by courts can be
attributed to several causes, such as: (1) the lack of familiarity with
music theory; (2) the sometimes unhelpful contribution of music
experts; (3) the failure to fully appreciate the constraints of Western
tonality; and (4) the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between
copying from the plaintiffs work and the defendant's general reliance
on the extensive public domain Western music repertoire upon which
modern Western composers draw.
A recent federal district court decision exemplifies many of the
difficulties confronting judges and juries in music infringement cases.
In Straughter v. Raymond,331 the plaintiff Straughter alleged that the
defendants had infringed the copyright in his song "The Reasons Why"
("Reasons") by creating and recording their song "Burn."3 3 2  The
plaintiff composed his song in 1998; the defendants composed theirs in
2003.333 The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing,
among other things, that the plaintiffs song lacked originality and
that the plaintiff had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of access and
substantial similarity.
In adjudicating the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
the court first disposed of some preliminary issues regarding copyright
registration334 and unclean hands,335 then it proceeded to decide the
331. Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV 08-2170 CAS (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011).
332. Id. at *5-7.
333. Id. at *6-7.
334. Id. at *9-11. The defendants argued that the copyright registration obtained in the
plaintiffs song "Reasons" did not also cover the recorded version of the song entitled "No More
Pain" (hereinafter "Pain"). Id. at *9. The court found that because both "Reasons" and "Pain"
were "identical in all material respects," the copyright registration for "Reasons" applied to
"Pain" as well. Id. at *10-11.
335. Id. at *14-18. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff falsely asserted complete
ownership of the copyright to "Reasons," when in fact he owned only a 13 percent share of it. Id.
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central infringement issues. The court noted that the plaintiff had to
prove that he owned a valid copyright and that the defendants had
impermissibly copied his work.3 36 Because the plaintiff had registered
his copyright in "Reasons" before the song's publication, he was
entitled to the presumption of the copyright's validity.337 Attempting
to rebut that presumption, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs
song was unoriginal and therefore not subject to copyright
protection.338 The court, however, rejected that argument as a matter
of law, observing that originality exists even where plaintiffs have
based their works on public domain or other earlier materials, so long
as the plaintiffs have contributed more than a "merely trivial"
variation to the prior works.339 Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent,
the court adopted an extremely low standard for originality,340 and
found little merit in the defense expert's attempt to show that the
plaintiffs song was similar in a number of respects to older R&B and
other types of songs.341
The court in Straughter then examined the core elements of the
plaintiffs copyright infringement case: access and substantial
similarity.342 Without any direct evidence of copying, the plaintiff had
to prove that the defendants had access to the plaintiffs song and that
the two works showed substantial similarity.343  Relying on a
chain-of-events theory, the plaintiff attempted to demonstrate that
one or more of the defendants had access to his song through
generalized contacts between the two sets of partieS344 and through
the involvement of a third-party intermediary who had contact with
at *12. The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiffs
ownership interest, thus precluding summary judgment. Id. at *15. In addition, even if the
plaintiff had misrepresented the extent of his ownership, the defendants suffered no prejudice as
a result. Accordingly, the doctrine of unclean hands did not bar the plaintiffs infringement
action. Id. at *16-17.
336. Id. at *18.
337. See id. at *19-21 (clarifying prior Ninth Circuit cases and rejecting the defendants'
argument that the plaintiff was not entitled to the presumption of validity of his copyright
because he filed suit almost ten years after registration).
338. Id. at *21-22.
339. Id. at *22-24.
340. See id. at *22 (explaining that to qualify for copyright protection, an author need
only add some nontrivial variation to existing works-"something recognizably 'his own').
341. See id. at *23-24 (discussing the general unhelpfulness of expert testimony).
342. Id. at *24.
343. See id. at *25 (noting that the plaintiff must show the defendants had a "reasonable
possibility" of seeing the plaintiffs work either through a chain of events connecting the
plaintiffs work and the defendants' access to it or wide dissemination of the plaintiffs work).
344. See id. at *25-26 (describing the plaintiffs unsuccessful attempt to establish access
through "a convoluted series of personal contacts and purported collaborations" between the
defendant and the band that first recorded the plaintiffs song).
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both sides.3 45 Although the evidence that the plaintiff adduced was
somewhat speculative and tenuous,346 the court found that the
plaintiff had presented enough for his access theory to survive
summary judgment.347 Interestingly, the court, on its own initiative,
uncovered evidence of fairly wide dissemination of the plaintiffs song
to buttress the chain-of-events theory of access.348
In addressing substantial similarity between the plaintiffs and
defendants' works, the court in Straughter referred to the Ninth
Circuit's approach, where the trier of fact performs an objective
extrinsic analysis of the two works followed by a subjective intrinsic
analysis of them.349 At the summary judgment stage, the judge does
an extrinsic analysis alone to determine whether the case should
proceed to trial.350 Under the extrinsic component of substantial
similarity, the court compares the protected elements of the two
works.351 But the court in Straughter acknowledged that the Ninth
Circuit has never defined a "uniform set of factors for analyzing a
musical composition under the extrinsic test."352 The court observed
that a composer can combine a wide variety of elements, unprotectable
in isolation, to form a musical composition-elements such as "lyrics,
rhythm, pitch, cadence, melody, harmony, tempo, phrasing, structure,
chord progression, instrumental figures, and others."3 5 3  Quoting
Swirsky v. Carey, the leading Ninth Circuit precedent on infringement
of musical works, the court described the plaintiffs burden with
respect to the extrinsic test: "So long as the plaintiff can demonstrate,
through expert testimony that addresses some or all of these elements
and supports its employment of them, that the similarity was
'substantial' and to 'protected elements' of the copyrighted work, the
extrinsic test is satisfied."354
345. See id. at *28-35 (detailing the contacts that the producer of the album that first
contained the plaintiffs song had with both the plaintiff and the defendants).
346. See id. at *35 (acknowledging that the evidence of access via a third-party
intermediary was "weak").
347. Id. at *37.
348. See id. at *39 (taking judicial notice of evidence that in 1999 the album on which the
plaintiffs song was first recorded reached number 197 on the "Billboard 200" chart and number
thirty-two on the "Billboard R & B/Hip Hop" chart). At the same time, the court refused to apply
the "inverse ratio rule," under which a strong showing of access can counterbalance a weaker
showing of substantial similarity. Id. at *41-42.
349. See id. at *42.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at *43.
353. Id.
354. See id. (quoting Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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Applying the Swirsky test, the court in Straughter then found
that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence, through the
testimony of his expert, George Saadi, to survive defendants' summary
judgment motion.355  The court pointed to Saadi's discovery of
numerous commonalities between the two songs, such as the use of a
lengthy eighteen-bar introduction and a "substantially similar"
structure.356 In rejecting the defendants' argument that Saadi failed
to distinguish between ideas and expression in his expert report, the
court opined that musicologists are not qualified to identify "ideas" for
the purpose of copyright law.3 57 In addition, although some of the
similar elements that Saadi identified may be unprotectable by
themselves, copyright law can protect a combination of
uncopyrightable elements.358 In contrast to the plaintiffs expert's
approach, the defendants' expert made a detailed analysis of both
compositions using a note-by-note comparison of the two melodies.359
This analysis, almost mathematical in its precision, provided
compelling evidence that although the two works had some structural
similarities, their melodies were quite distinct.360 If melody drives the
infringement bus, as it generally has, then it would seem that the
defendants did not impermissibly copy the plaintiffs composition.361
Ultimately, the court in Straughter found that the plaintiffs
expert, Saadi, had credibly identified enough similarities between the
355. Id. at *49.
356. Id. at *43-49, 54 (referring extensively to the expert's report on the disputed works).
357. Id. at *51.
358. Id. at *51-52.
359. In his report, the defendants' expert recorded numerous differences between the
melodies of the disputed works:
The specific differences between each motif in Pain and each corresponding motif in
Burn are summarized below.
... Motif A/tag - Dr. Keyes [plaintiffs expert] identifies the following pitch sequences
as Motif A/tag in Pain and Burn:
Pain - 1-4-3-1-7-7-2-1
Burn - 1-2-4-3-2-1-4-3-2-1
A pitch sequence of 1-4-3-1-7-7-2-1 plainly is not the same as or similar to a pitch
sequence of 1-2-4-3-2-1 or 4-3-2-1. And while both iterations of Motif A/tag in Burn
contain the 4-3-2-1 sequence-a commonplace, building-block major scale in
music-Motif A/tag in Burn does not contain that sequence at all. In addition, Motif
A/tag in Burn has an ornamental quick note (as transcribed by Dr. Keyes, but not
reported in her narrative) that is not in Motif A/tag in Pain.
See Reply Decl. of Lawrence Ferrara at 2-3, Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV 08-2170 CAS (CWx),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (No. 242-9).
360. Id.
361. Some courts, however, have recognized that harmony may be original: "While we
agree that melody generally implies a limited range of chords which can accompany it, a
composer may exercise creativity in selecting among these chords." Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous
Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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two works to raise a genuine issue of material fact.36 2 The efforts of
the defendants' expert to call into question the quality and relevance
of Saadi's analysis were unavailing in the context of the summary
judgment motion. The court obviously felt most comfortable with
leaving the major issues for resolution at trial where experts from
both sides could undergo vigorous cross-examination.
The Straughter opinion in many ways typifies the challenges
that courts face in music infringement cases-however thoughtful,
careful, and legally expert those courts may be. The evidence of access
in Straughter was weak, and the similarities between the two works
were born more of an overall structural resemblance, as opposed to
actual similarity between the melody, harmony, and rhythm. In
analyzing the plaintiffs evidence of access, the court displayed some
inconsistency. At one moment, the judge rejected the notion that
access existed because the band that recorded the plaintiffs song and
the defendant Raymond were close in age and had common
backgrounds.3 3 But later the court found access plausible on the
basis that the plaintiff, the defendants, and the producer of the album
on which the plaintiffs song appeared "r[a]n in the same musical
circles."36 4  If "running in the same musical circles" is sufficient
evidence of access, then arguably access would exist in every case in
which the plaintiffs and defendants work in the same genre or are in
geographic proximity. Access, then, would lose any significance as a
separate criterion for copying.
Similarly, the court's evaluation of the experts' reports seems
like an almost inevitable, if not meaningless, exercise. The experts,
both of whom had more than respectable musical credentials, reached
diametrically opposite conclusions, as might be expected.365 The judge
in Straughter, like any layperson, had to rely on the superficial logic
and credibility of the experts' analyses. Either expert opinion could be
"true," but both could not be. Thus, given the possibility that the
plaintiff could eventually prevail at trial, the court felt constrained to
let the case go forward, to put the plaintiff to his proof, and to allow
the jury to decide the infringement question. But it is not at all clear
that, even with the benefit of a complete trial, the jury would be any
better equipped to evaluate the access evidence and to parse the
expert testimony.
362. Straughter, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068, at *54-55.
363. Id. at *26-27.
364. Id. at *35-36.
365. The plaintiffs expert found that the two works had "both substantial and striking
similarities." Id. at *46. The plaintiffs expert did not go unchallenged. See id. at *50-53.
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V. OBSERVATIONS AND A MODEST PROPOSAL
A. The Unique Challenges of Music Infringement Cases
As most students of music infringement have concluded, music
is different from other expressive works protected by copyright.366
How it is different has been difficult to describe.367 Based on the
Authors' study of litigated music infringement cases, including both
the disputed musical works and the judicial analysis of the
infringement elements, this Article offers several observations as well
as a modest proposal for changes in the manner in which courts
approach these types of cases.
First, although one can read a musical score, generally music
gains its primary value from being performed and heard. As
mentioned above, neurological science suggests that music is
understood, stored, and recollected in specific areas of the human
brain.368 Additionally, as a result of the idiosyncrasies of the human
brain and experience, hearing and listening are not democratic.369
Potential jurors adjudging substantial similarity in music
infringement cases will vary enormously in their ability to discern
musical nuances in particular pieces and to determine similarities
between them.
Second, contemporary musical works tend to resemble one
another, particularly within genres.370 Many of these similarities can
366. See, e.g., Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1956) ("Of all the arts, music is
perhaps the least tangible."); Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An
Improved Approach for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 DuQ. L. REV. 277, 278 (1993)
("Music is particularly ill-suited to the analysis designed by [the Ninth Circuit in] Krofft; due to
music's inherently distinctive features which dictate a different inquiry to determine substantial
similarity."); Cadwell, supra note 327, at 157 ("[M]usic's unique nature makes it difficult to draw
a distinction between idea and expression."); Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for
Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 443 (1988) (observing that it is impossible to
apply the standard infringement analysis to musical works: "I do not see how it can be done").
367. See Joan Stambaugh, Expressive Autonomy in Music, in UNDERSTANDING THE
MUSICAL EXPERIENCE 167 (F. Joseph Smith ed., 1989) ("Music in particular takes us into an even
more rarified sphere, beyond concepts, representation and objectivity. For this reason there may
have been more divergence of opinion, confusion and misunderstanding about what music is and
is supposed to do than about any of the other arts.").
368. See OLIVER SACKS, MUSICOPHILIA: TALES OF MUSIC AND THE BRAIN 117-18 (2008)
(discussing areas of the brain involved in music comprehension and enjoyment).
369. See AARON COPLAND, WHAT TO LISTEN FOR IN MUSIC 7 (New Am. Library 2009)
(1939) ("We all listen to music according to our separate capacities.").
370. See Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 946 (8th Cir. 1992)
(adopting the defendants' experts' views that any similarity between the disputed works was
attributable to their common "R & B/hip-hop genre").
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be traced to the use of common public domain elements.371 And, the
musical content of many recent popular works is rather simple,
stylistically similar, and perhaps even generic.372  The primary
economic value of contemporary music derives from the recording,
staging, and promotion of a particular artist's performance.373 The
artist's mystique, charisma, glamour, and vocal ability arguably push
music sales more than the originality, sophistication, and depth of the
songs sung by that artist.
Third, there is an inherent tension among the doctrines
relating to subconscious copying, access, and independent creation.
Courts have found subconscious copying in several cases where the
plaintiffs work was widely disseminated, but the defendant vigorously
denied any conscious recollection of it.11 On the other hand, even
where the disputed works bore a relatively close resemblance to each
other, courts denied relief to plaintiffs whose only proof of access
rested on some degree of dissemination or on a chain of events
beginning with the plaintiff and ending (supposedly) with the
defendant.375
Defendants in both types of cases-wide dissemination and
chain-of-events-often assert independent creation as a defense to
infringement. Sometimes, defendants easily establish independent
creation because of chronological impossibility-that is, the defendant
wrote his composition before the plaintiff wrote hers.37 6 In other
cases, defendants have tried to show independent creation through a
detailed presentation of their creative process-jam sessions,
brainstorming with cowriters, plunking out tunes on the piano, and so
371. See Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1976)
(observing that the common elements between the disputed works could be traced to several
earlier compositions); McMahon v. Harms, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 779, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (same).
372. For decades, judges have felt constrained to comment on the rudimentary nature of
popular musical works. See, e.g., Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940)
("[W]hile there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes of the
scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular
ear."); Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910) ('The defendant urges with much
truth that both his own and the complainant's songs are in the lowest grades of the musical
art.").
373. See Ben Ratliff, Through the Wormhole with Bjork, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at Cl
(describing an elaborate multimedia concert involving mechanical devices, videos, dancers, and
the lead singer, Bjork, in "a rust-colored wig and blue plastic dress with nautilus-shaped
attachments at the hips and breasts").
374. See supra notes 262-64, 279-87 and accompanying text.
375. See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming the trial court's
j.n.o.v. in favor of the defendants where the two songs were extremely similar but access was
somewhat weak).
376. See Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding
that the defendants' song was written before the plaintiffs).
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forth.377 Some courts have been more convinced than others of the
true independence of the defendant's creative effort. The similarity
between the two works and the credibility of the defendant's evidence
carry significant weight in the final determination.
One of the familiar saws attached to independent creation is
the notion that if someone autonomously wrote a poem identical to
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, the second poem would be considered
original and thus copyrightable.378 Of course, the chance of such an
occurrence is extremely low. In the musical realm, on the other hand,
such an independent duplication may be much more probable. The
restrictions of Western tonal music, the relative simplicity of
contemporary popular works, the commonality within genres, the rich
shared musical heritage of most Western composers, and the vast and
pervasive daily exposure to music experienced, especially by music
professionals, can result, not surprisingly, in the creation of two
similar works by two different composers at two different times.379
Independent creation is intimately tied to originality, which is
at the core of copyright protection. Originality is both statutorily and
constitutionally required as a predicate for copyright.380 Under the
famous Supreme Court formulation in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., originality consists of independently created
expression that entails a minimal level of creativity.3 81 Given the
factors discussed above that restrict compositional choices, and the
conceivable exhaustion of the most pleasing melodic combinations, one
may justly ask, "Is there anything new under the sun?" In other
words, is the contemporary popular composer doing anything more
377. See, e.g., Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 975 (11th Cir. 1986) (describing the
defendants' compositional process).
378. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[B]ut if by
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn,
he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats's.").
379. The great copyright scholar Benjamin Kaplan observed that the "musical tradition
tolerates considerable definite and deliberate borrowing provided the later composer
manipulates what he has taken" and that "the law can afford to take a permissive attitude
toward cross-lifting among serious musical works." KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 53.
380. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991) (referencing the
1976 Copyright Act's extension of copyright to only "original works of authorship"). Feist further
notes that the IP Clause of the US Constitution refers to "Writings" and "Authors," both of which
connote originality. See id. at 346.
381. See id. at 345 ("Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.").
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than recycling timeworn musical motifs from the near and distant
past?382
Fourth, any set of legal rules intended to determine
infringement in music cases must account for the interests of both
plaintiffs and defendants. Many plaintiffs in these cases are
composers who are struggling to advance their careers by securing the
interest of successful artists who might want to perform and promote
their work.383 Other plaintiffs have enjoyed a moderate level of
success as composers of music that has been produced and performed
on a modest scale.3 84  The defendants, on the other hand, are
invariably highly successful music producers, composers, or
performers.385 The plaintiffs are convinced that more powerful figures
in the music industry have stolen and exploited their work.38 6 The
defendants believe that the plaintiffs are trying to piggyback on the
defendants' fame and economic success by alleging plagiarism.
From their respective positions, each party suffers considerable
frustrations. Plaintiffs who submitted songs to major record labels
face the obstacle of trying to prove that their work found its way into
the hands (and ears) of the defendants. Defendants can always
obscure the path that the plaintiffs work took to reach them and
make it virtually impossible for the plaintiff to prove access.87
Defendants, on the other hand, experience the constant irritation, not
to mention the cost, of defending against infringement suits by
unknown composers claiming a piece of the defendants' hard-won
success. This David-and-Goliath paradigm, of course, is present in
382. See Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 78 (2004) ("All artists create using much they have not
themselves created, both in terms of physical and human surroundings and in terms of cultural
heritage. The holders of a common cultural tradition resemble the inhabitants of Locke's state of
nature: their riches are largely not of their own making.").
383. E. Scott Fruehwald, Copyright Infringement of Musical Compositions: A Systematic
Approach, 26 AKRON L. REV. 15, 16 (1992) ("The typical situation occurs when the composer of an
unknown work files suit claiming that a popular, financially successful piece has been copied
from his work.").
384. See, e.g., Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 137 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing the
plaintiffs achievements as a composer of Latin music).
385. See, e.g., Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2009) (defendant Mary J. Blige);
Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997) (defendant Andrew Lloyd Webber); Pal mieri, 88
F.3d at 136 (defendant Gloria Estefan); Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1996)
(defendant Michael Jackson).
386. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 464 (2d Cir. 1946) ("Plaintiff said that
defendant 'had stooges right along to follow me, watch me, and live in the same apartment with
me,' and that plaintiffs room had been ransacked on several occasions.").
387. See, e.g., Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995) (observing that the
record companies to which the plaintiff had allegedly submitted her demo tape refused to speak
with her).
2013] 283
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
other aspects of the entertainment and advertising industries-for
instance, the struggling writer who submits a treatment or screenplay
to a movie studio; a photographer who does a proposal for an
advertising campaign; or a makeup designer who creates initial
sketches for a theatre company.388 But, in those instances, it is often
easier to distinguish ideas from expression and to determine
substantial similarity because of the larger range of choices available
to an artist working in a literary or visual art medium.
Fifth, the whole question of access by the defendant to the
plaintiffs composition has become more complicated with the advent
of the Internet. In the past, struggling songwriters would attempt to
submit a tape or CD to a record company in the hopes that it might be
published or performed.389 If the defendant later produced a similar
song, the plaintiff was often stymied by the difficulties of showing that
his or her composition reached the defendant's eyes or ears.390 Today
many aspiring songwriters post their work online and make it freely
available.391 In this setting, plaintiffs could readily argue that the
defendants could have accessed their work at any time without any
knowledge by the plaintiffs. In other words, wide dissemination, one
of the traditional methods of proving access, becomes almost
inevitable as more and more prospective plaintiffs establish websites
and encourage the public to listen to their music compositions online.
Sixth, experts occupy an essential role in music infringement
cases because of the general inaccessibility of music structure and
theory to the average lay person. Even without the assistance of
expert testimony, most ordinary individuals have a healthy capacity to
discern whether two photographs, paintings, plays, and novels are
similar, to the extent that the later work is likely to have been copied
388. See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447-48 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (involving a plaintiff photographer who had provided a sample photograph to an
advertising agency that then apparently used a very similar photograph in its advertising
campaign without the plaintiffs permission); Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236,
241-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving a plaintiff who created some of the makeup designs for the
original New York production of the musical Cats and alleged that the defendants exploited
those designs without her permission); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDK (Gx), 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11109, at *2.4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989) (involving a plaintiff who alleged that his
treatment for a Rocky movie was used without permission when the defendants wrote the
screenplay for Rocky IV).
389. See, e.g., Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the
plaintiffs submission of a "Demo Tape" to various music producers).
390. See, e.g., McRae v. Smith, 968 F. Supp. 559, 563-64 (D. Colo. 1997) (noting that
virtually none of the individuals to whom the plaintiff had allegedly submitted her demo tape
could recall having received or heard the tape).
391. See Damian Kulash, Jr., The New Rock-Star Paradigm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010,
at Dl (detailing how musicians have used various business models to generate revenue).
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from the earlier work (assuming that the plaintiff has demonstrated
evidence of access). In other words, regardless of what various hired
experts may say, the average person knows what he or she sees and
reads. But in music cases, does the jury really know what it is
hearing?392 Works that are musically unalike can sound similar, and
works that are musically alike can sound different, depending on the
performer's presentation and the listener's musical sophistication. As
a result, the musical expert's views carry special weight-the expert
tells the lay listeners what exactly they are hearing.
At the same time, however, the various experts may tend to
cancel one another out. At the summary judgment stage, the trial
court is faced with affidavits and reports from both parties' experts.
Both sets of experts are usually well-qualified musicologists or music
theorists, who have often provided expert testimony in similar cases in
the past. Without some glaring shortfall in the analysis tendered by
one side's expert, the judge must usually deny summary judgment and
leave the ultimate issues of probative and substantial similarity for
resolution at trial. At trial, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) will
come up against the same difficulty experienced at the summary
judgment stage-two sets of experts testifying for the plaintiff and the
defendant, each with a credible interpretation of the musicological
similarity or dissimilarity of the disputed works.393
Seventh, the compulsory or mechanical license for musical
works provided for in § 115 of the Copyright Act reflects a
congressional judgment that such works should be available for second
comers to use in creating their own interpretations.3 9 4 Although
392. Shortly after Arnstein v. Porter was decided, one judge was almost apoplectic at that
case's insistence on the reasonable-lay-listener standard for infringement:
[T]he issue is no longer one of musical similarity or identity to justify the conclusion of
copying-a[n] issue to be decided with all the intelligence, musical as well as legal we
can bring to bear upon it-but is one, first, of copying, to be decided more or less
intelligently, and, second, of illicit copying, to be decided blindly on a mere cacophony
of sounds.
Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 491 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., concurring).
393. See, e.g., Allen v. Walt Disney Prods., 41 F. Supp. 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(expressing extreme frustration at the irreconcilable views of the two parties' experts and stating
"I cannot differentiate between the two sets of experts; neither can I say that complainant's
experts are correct and the respondents' incorrect").
394. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006); see Paul S. Rosenlund, Compulsory
Licensing of Musical Compositions for Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 683, 686 (1979) ("The feelings in Congress at the time were that the American
public should continue to have access to the popular music of the day, but that the growing
economic importance of mechanically reproduced music made it necessary to guarantee
composers adequate compensation for their work." (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909)).
The compulsory license allows a later performer to make "a musical arrangement of the
[licensed] work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of
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originally introduced into the Copyright Act of 1909 to break the
anticipated iron grip of a few powerful recording companies, the
mechanical license perhaps has persisted in the law in oblique
recognition of the desirability of the widest possible dissemination of
music. Of course, second users are required to pay the statutory
royalty to do their own rendition of the copyrighted work, but the goal
of widespread availability of music is still at the heart of the
mechanical license.
Finally, from a musicological point of view, given the finite
range of choices offered by Western tonality, with its established or
commonly shared harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, and formal practices,
it is virtually inevitable that certain compositions may resemble each
other closely without plagiarism.395  Examples abound from both
traditional classical works and contemporary popular works, yet
arguably none are plagiarized; rather, they are prominent
incorporations of an otherwise conventional tonal or formal type.
B. Musical Antecedents of Contemporary Popular Music
In determining whether a contemporary work is original or in
fact based on a public domain antecedent, one must inevitably
reference those works and practices whose scale, scope, and
achievement defined the limits and possibilities of tonal music. A
short list of composers who ultimately realized such possibilities
includes, chronologically: Monteverdi (d. 1643), Bach, Haydn, Mozart,
Beethoven, Schubert, Chopin, Wagner, Verdi, Brahms, Mahler,
Debussy, Bartok, and Stravinsky (d. 1971). These works and practices
exhausted virtually all tonal, formal, rhythmic, metric, contrapuntal,
compositional, and theoretical possibilities within the realm of
tonality. As one might cite legal precedents as examples to defend or
prove a legal point, so must a music analyst follow a similar method in
analyzing scores to determine plagiarism.
the performance involved." 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). At the same time, the later performer "shall not
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work." Id.
395. The exact rhythm or intervallic melodic shape (for instance, melody including
pickup note(s))-given varying or modified tempi, meter, rhythmic values, etc.--of a rising
perfect fourth, followed by a rising major second and another rising second, found in, for
example, Irving Berlin's "How Dry I Am" (alkla "The Near Future") may also be found in the
initial phrase of the following (exactly, in adjustment of major to minor, or vice versa): Bach's
Invention in A Minor; the first theme of the second movement of Beethoven's Second Symphony;
the first theme in the last movement of Beethoven's Pathitique Piano Sonata in C Minor; "Doctor
Gradus ad Parnassum" of Debussy's Children's Corner Suite; the Transfiguration Theme of
Richard Strauss's tone poem, "Death and Transfiguration"; and Cole Porter's song "Don't Fence
Me In." Distinctive as these works are, the "How Dry I Am" memory identity is never lost.
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By extension, late nineteenth- and twentieth-century European
composers of operetta, such as Lehar,396 FrimI,3 97 Herbert,398
Romberg,399 and Sullivan0 0 set the standard for lighter fare, which
heavily influenced such US masters of song in musical theatre as
Kern,401 Gershwin,402 Berlin,403 Porter,404 Rodgers,40 Bernstein,406
Lerner,40 7 Sondheim,408 Herman,409 and Kander.4 10 These composers,
along with parallel developments in jazz, are the closest purveyors of
and greatest influence on popular music, including rock, known today.
Equally important, African-American music from c. 1900, including
the blues, work songs, shouts, chants, gospel, and ragtime, provided
the foundation for rap, hip-hop, and the like.41 1
Courts and juries can compare, detect, or recognize potential
compositional infringement from one work to another by consulting,
comparing, and analyzing the vast lexicon of extant works and
practices as referred to in this Article and beyond. The following is a
short survey of such points of reference as they apply to the potential
practice of plagiarism in virtually any Western tonal style or form.
A common musical language implies a common vocabulary,
allowing for regional accents and idioms of time and place. For
example, Bach's chromaticism is more clearly rooted in tonal
conventions than is Wagner's pervasive chromaticism (as found in
Tristan and Isolde). Yet, both reveal a common adherence to tonal
(for instance, tertian) harmony. In other words, a closer inspection
396. See, e.g., FRANZ LEHAR, THE MERRY WIDOW (Deutsche Grammophon 1995).
397. See, e.g., RUDOLF FRIML, Rose Marie, on FRIML: THE VAGABOND KING (EMI Records
Ltd. 2005).
398. See, e.g., VICTOR HERBERT, Naughty Marietta, on HERBERT: NAUGHTY
MARIETTA/BYESS, OHIO LIGHT OPERA (Albany Records 2001).
399. See, e.g., SIGMUND ROMBERG, The Desert Song, on AN EVENING WITH SIGMUND
ROMBERG (EMI Angel/Capitol 1990).
400. See, e.g., SIR ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE MIKADO (Telarc Records 1992).
401. See, e.g., JEROME KERN, Show Boat, on KERN & HAMMERSTEIN II (EMI Classics
2006).
402. See, e.g., GEORGE GERSHWIN, Porgy and Bess, on GERSHWIN: PORGY AND BESS
(Decca Records 2007) (an opera/operetta/musical hybrid).
403. See, e.g., IRVING BERLIN, ANNIE GET YOUR GUN (Decca Records 2000).
404. See, e.g., COLE PORTER, KISS ME, KATE (Sony Records 1998).
405. See, e.g., RICHARD RODGERS, OKLAHOMA! (MCA Records 1993).
406. See, e.g., LEONARD BERNSTEIN, WEST SIDE STORY (Sony Records 2004).
407. See, e.g., ALAN JAY LERNER, MY FAIR LADY (Legacy/Sony Classical 2011).
408. See, e.g., STEPHEN SONDHEIM, SWEENEY TODD, THE DEMON BARBER OF FLEET
STREET (RCA RECORDS 2007).
409. See, e.g., JERRY HERMAN, HELLO, DOLLY! (Sony Classics 2009).
410. See, e.g., JOHN KANDER, CABARET (Sony Classics 2009).
411. Some contemporary popular songs are so musically basic that they are all but
impossible to plagiarize.
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reveals that Bach and Wagner are drinking from the same well of
tonality.
There are a number of common conventions of melodic,
harmonic, rhythmic, and formal practices in Western music. The
standard examples include: melodic shapes based on scalar movement,
broken chords, sequences of two or three phrases or partial phrases,
repetition, ABA or AB structure (the most popular song standards),
climactic high point (the highest note of the piece, or, less often, the
lowest note), and resolution.412 Because tonal foundations are limited
to eight primary tones and five secondary (chromatic) ones, melodies
may easily resemble each other up to a point.413
A typical melody of Bach is conceived motifically to better
accommodate his predominant complex contrapuntal textures.414
Haydn, Mozart, early Beethoven, and other Classicists typically wrote
very symmetric phrases of two- or four-bar lengths.415  Haydn,
however, often upset this symmetry by adding an extra bar or two,
thus creating phrases of irregular length.416 Mature Beethoven wrote
brief, motific melodies suitable for development.417 But he also wrote
hymn-like themes featuring simple rhythmic and intervallic shapes.418
Late Beethoven (1816-1827) wrote broad, sweeping, romantic themes
replete with chromatic intervals, pauses, and even changes of tempo
as a means of enhancing melodic expression.419
Schubert's melodies are influenced by folk song and dance. His
lieder are typically written in syllabic, that is, nonoperatic style.420
Their simple rhythms, usually symmetric phrases, and chromatic or
diatonic style perfectly suit their settings whether in song, symphony,
or chamber music. 4 2 1 Bellini greatly influenced the song-like style of
412. See COPLAND, supra note 369, at 100-05.
413. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
414. See JOHANN SEBASTIAN BACH, Mass in B Minor, First Mvt. (1749); JOHANN
SEBASTIAN BACH, Double Violin Concerto, First Mvt., First theme (1731); JOHANN SEBASTIAN
BACH, The Passion According to St. Matthew, Penultimate Mvt., First theme (1727); JOHANN
SEBASTIAN BACH, Brandenburg Concerto No. 2, First Mvt., First theme (1721).
415. See LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, Symphony No. 2, Second Mvt., First theme (1802);
JOSEPH HAYDN, Symphony No. 104, First Mvt. (1795); WOLFGANG AMADEUS MOZART, Symphony
No. 40, First Mvt., First theme (1788)
416. See JOSEPH HAYDN, Symphony No. 104, Minuet (1795).
417. See LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, Symphony No. 3, First Mvt., First theme (1804).
418. See LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, Violin Concerto, Second Mvt., First theme (1806).
419. See LUDWIG VAN BEETHOVEN, String Quartet No. 15, Op. 132, Fifth Mvt., First
theme (1825).
420. See FRANZ SCHUBERT, String Quartet No. 15, First Mvt., First theme (1826); FRANZ
SCHUBERT, Ave Maria (1825); FRANZ SCHUBERT, Symphony No. 8, First Myt., Second theme
(1821).
421. See supra note 420.
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Chopin in its long, elegant, broadly arched shape, typically supported
by expressive, chromatic harmony.422 There is a close connection
between Chopin's Fantaisie-Impromptu and its secondary theme,
which became the popular song "I'm Always Chasing Rainbows."423
Such examples abound. Wagner's themes synthesize motific structure
with aria-like melodies whose shape expands through the use of
melodic sixths and sevenths.424 The late nineteenth-century island of
Classical-Romantic style that Brahms inhabited features a
motif-based German songlike style of thirds or sixths, at times
outlining an octave.425 Brahms's themes may function as broadly
sweeping, expressive melody, or, upon closer analysis, tight
contrapuntal forms, as in the simultaneous first theme (and its
accompaniment as canonic imitation of itself) of the first movement of
his Fourth Symphony.426 Mahler's themes further expanded melodic
shape through the interpolation of thirds above the basic four-note
chordal structure through intervals of ninths, elevenths, and
thirteenths, thus incorporating the entire diatonic scale.427 These
harmonies, thus expanded, contribute immeasurably to the
enrichment of expressiveness. To these elements, Mahler, like
Wagner and Liszt, added chromatic interpolations of passing tones,
appoggiaturas, suspensions, and other nonharmonic tones, all
supported by corresponding harmonies.428 This angular, melodic style
produced in Richard Strauss's Wagner-idolizing tone poem Ein
Heldenleben is a primary theme encompassing more than
two-and-a-half octaves.429
Mature Debussy wrote nonsymmetric or extremely symmetric
melodies heavily spiced by the incorporation of whole-tone intervals
and harmonies, modal themes (especially the Dorian mode),
Pentatonic structures, or a combination of all three.430 His themes
422. See REY M. LONGYEAR, NINETEENTH-CENTURY ROMANTICISM IN Music 80 (1969).
423. See PYOTR ILYICH TCHAIKOVSKY, Piano Concerto No. 1 (1874) (first theme became
"Tonight We Love"); WILHELM RICHARD WAGNER, Lohengrin (1850) (Bridal Chorus became
"Here Comes the Bride").
424. See WILHELM RICHARD WAGNER, Gotterdimmerung, Immolation Scene (1872);
WILHELM RICHARD WAGNER, TRISTAN UND ISOLDE, Prelude to Act One, First theme (1859).
425. See JOHANNES BRAHMS, Minnelied, Symphony No. 1, First Mvt., First theme (1876).
426. See JOHANNES BRAHMS, Symphony No. 4, First Mvt. (1885).
427. See GUSTAV MAHLER, Symphony No. 10, First Mvt., First theme (1910); GUSTAV
MAHLER, Das Lied Von der Erde, First Mvt. First theme (1909); GUSTAV MAHLER, Symphony No.
6, First Mvt., Second theme (1904).
428. See supra note 427.
429. See RICHARD STRAUSS, Der Rosenkavalier, Act Three (1911); RICHARD STRAUSS, Ein
Heldenleben, First theme (1898); RICHARD STRAUSS, Till Eulenspiegel, First theme (1895).
430. See CLAUDE DEBUSSY, Song for Voice and Piano, Clair de Lune (1890).
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tend to be short, non-songlike, elaborately evolved, quasi-arabesque
structures in nondevelopmental mosaic-like texture.431  Bartok,
heavily influenced by Debussy (as many of his contemporaries
were),432 wrote similar modal and tonal thematic constructs to which
he added the rich, intervallic, rhythmic, and metric store of
international folk music and dance, particularly that of his native
Hungary.433
The great Igor Stravinsky passed through Russian Romantic
thematic and harmonic style and Debussyan Impressionism to what
might be called Russian Expressionism or Barbarism as found in his
revolutionary ballet score, Le Sacre du Printemps (1913).434 The ballet
score's melodic structure incorporates a vast array of very short,
narrow-ranged, fragmented, and non-songlike melodies.435  The
primary importance of this revolutionary work rests in its asymmetric
use of constantly changing meters and accents, often in conjunction
with rhythmic ostinati.436 This work may also include or form part of
what is described as static harmony and melody.437 The closest
contemporary cousin of this fragmented melodic shape may be found
in pop music that repeats a simple melodic fragment throughout a
piece.438 Instead of Stravinsky's complex shifting metric figuration,
one may find a Latin-American accompaniment, a riff, a rock ostinato,
or the like.
This short review of the contours of Western musical
expression reveals that contemporary composers are inevitably
influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by traditions and practices
of generations of composers that preceded them. For centuries,
composers have been inspired by and have borrowed from their
forebears without self-consciousness or shame. Although the practice
of borrowing developed at a time when public bodies or private
patrons supported musicians, the notion of a shared cultural heritage,
431. See CLAUDE DEBUSSY, La Mer, Last Mvt. (1905); CLAUDE DEBUSSY, Prelude to the
Afternoon of a Faun, First theme (1894); CLAUDE DEBUSSY, Five Poems of Baudelaire (1890).
432. GROUT & PALISCA, supra note 257, at 667.
433. See BELA BARTOK, Violin Concerto, First Mvt., First theme (1938); BELA BARTOK,
Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta, First Mvt. (1936); BELA BARTOK, The Miraculous
Mandarin, Final Dance (1924).
434. See IGOR STRAVINSKY, Le Sacre du Printemps (1913).
435. GRIFFITHS, supra note 42, at 239.
436. Id.
437. See IGOR STRAVINSKY, Symphony in Three Muts., First Mvt., First theme (1945);
IGOR STRAVINSKY, Symphony of Psalms, Third Mvt., Final theme (1930); IGOR STRAVINSKY, Le
Sacre du Printemps, The Adoration of the Earth, The Sacrifice (1913).
438. See, e.g., RICHIE VALENS, La Bamba (Del Fi 1958).
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to which we are all heirs, arguably has as much relevance today as it
did during the time of Bach and Beethoven.
C. A New Methodology for Establishing Music Infringement
The current approach for establishing music infringement used
by the courts produces unfair results and consumes unnecessary
resources. A revamped approach that recognizes the limitations of
Western tonal music, expert testimony, and lay juries conceivably
would increase the accuracy of litigation outcomes and reduce
litigation costs. To these ends, this Article suggests four modifications
to the present method for determining copyright infringement in cases
involving popular musical compositions.
First, courts should increase the standard for infringement in
music cases to "striking similarity." In other words, courts should
require plaintiffs to prove that the two works in question are so
similar to each other that only copying can explain the resemblance.
The heightened standard would recognize the inevitable similarities
between two musical compositions in the same genre. It would also
acknowledge the limitations of Western tonal music and the wealth of
public domain music that constitutes the field from which all modern
composers harvest. This more stringent standard would also
discourage plaintiffs with weaker cases who are hoping to spur
financially successful defendants to settle, rather than incur the costs
of litigation. Finally, such a standard would allow more cases to be
resolved at the summary judgment stage, thus limiting litigation
costs.
Second, a court should presume a defendant's access to the
plaintiffs composition where the latter is reasonably available on the
Internet. As mentioned earlier, most up-and-coming songwriters
create their own websites or at least seek out websites where they can
post their compositions.4 3 9 With such ready-yet-anonymous access, it
is quite possible that defendants or someone affiliated with them
heard a given plaintiffs music. But access to the Internet, while
widely available, is usually anonymous, and it may be even more
difficult than in the usual chain-of-events situation for plaintiffs to
prove that defendants had more than a theoretical possibility of being
exposed to the plaintiffs' compositions. Thus, if plaintiffs have an
established online presence, there should be a rebuttable presumption
of access. Defendants could then rebut that presumption by showing
the improbability of access.
439. See supra note 391 and accompanying text.
2013] 291
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
Third, at the summary judgment stage and beyond, courts
should give particular weight to musical experts' analyses that
perform a pitch-by-pitch comparison of the disputed works. Just as
words are the basic components of novels and lines of computer code
are the fundamental elements of software programs, pitches are the
building blocks of musical works. One can construct the same setting
(e.g., a quiet English village in the nineteenth century) in two
different novels using entirely different words, and no infringement
would result.4 40 Similarly, one can write two software programs that
perform the same function (for instance, word processing) employing
different sequences of computer code usually without fear of
plagiarism.44 ' Therefore, in comparing two musical works, experts
should focus on the identity (or lack thereof) between the pitches of
each composition. Arguably, the best and most reliable method of
proving plagiarism, particularly to the layman, is to transfer the pitch
sequence from the musical staff to a numerical representation of the
score.442 For example, one can actually see the exact sequence of
pitches as numerical intervals that indicate the precise relationship of
one pitch or pitches to another, both in melody (including rhythm) and
in harmony. Even here, the proportion of similar or dissimilar
passages is crucial. One or more passages may in fact be identical in
both pieces. But if those passages are made up of commonplace or
conventional tonal musical rhetoric and thus common to virtually all
tonal music, plagiarism is not at work. 4 4 3
440. Under the scines-a-faire doctrine, an author is allowed to employ stock characters,
themes, and scenic elements to portray a particular time and place. E.g., Benay v. Warner Bros.
Entm't, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624-25 (9th Cir. 2010); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618
F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
441. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983) (suggesting that if the idea for a specific computer program can be expressed in a number
of ways, then a second programmer would not infringe an earlier programmer's work by trying to
express the same idea without mimicking the earlier programmer's source code); E.F. Johnson
Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1502 n.17 (D. Minn. 1985) ("Had [the defendant]
contented itself with surveying the general outline of the [plaintiffs] program, thereafter
converting the scheme into detailed code through its own imagination, creativity, and
independent hought, a claim of infringement would not have arisen.").
442. See, e.g., Reply Decl. of Lawrence Ferrara, Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV 08-2170
CAS (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (No. 242-9).
443. Compare PYOTR ILYICH TCHAIKOVSKY, Nutcracker Ballet, Act ii (G major), Grande
Pas de Deux (1892), with GEORGE FRIDERIC HANDEL, Joy to the World (1721). Both are made up
of descending major scales encompassing an octave but with different rhythms. Compare
GEORGE & IRA GERSHWIN, Bess, You Is My Woman Now, on PORGY & BESS (Decca Records 2006)
(first four pitches), with SAMMY FAIN, April Love (1957). Their intervallic structure is identical,
an ascending major third followed by a descending major sixth, followed by an ascending major
second. If the works ended there, one might claim plagiarism. But after their initial utterance,
the works diverge-go their own way, so to speak. Hence, no plagiarism.
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If Composer A created a country-western ballad about a woman
whose husband left her, using one sequence of pitches, and Composer
B wrote a similar song with the same theme using a different pitch
sequence, then a court should not find infringement, despite the
overall similarity of the listening experience. If the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate a striking similarity in the selection and arrangement of
pitches, then summary judgment for the defendant is warranted.
Fourth, if the plaintiff can survive summary judgment by
proving sufficient similarity at the pitch level, then at trial, the
reactions of ordinary lay listeners should continue to determine
whether there is a striking similarity between disputed works. But in
assessing those reactions, courts should encourage the parties to
submit in evidence the results of surveys of such listeners, similar to
the surveys used to prove actual confusion in trademark infringement
cases.4 4 4  As discussed previously, experts and juries tend to have
certain weaknesses in determining similarity between two works of
music. Parties hire experts to produce opinions with a particular end
in mind.4 4 5 Juries, usually containing only six members in federal
civil cases, may have idiosyncratic listening abilities even if the voir
dire process has successfully weeded out individuals who are "tone
deaf." 4 4 6 They may not reflect a true cross-section of the population
that might be the audience for a particular kind of music. Focus
groups or consumer surveys, especially when targeted towards the
likely audience for the parties' musical genre,447 may more accurately
reflect whether the two disputed works are similar to the ears of the
average lay listener.448 Ultimately, the plaintiff is most concerned
444. See, e.g., Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods. LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771, 776 (8th
Cir. 2010) (discussing the use of consumer surveys as a means of demonstrating actual confusion
in trademark infringement cases); H-D Mich., Inc. v. Top Quality Serv. Inc., 496 F.3d 755, 762
(7th Cir. 2007) (same); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 487-88 (5th Cir.
2004) (same).
445. See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) ("The bias and distortions of truth-finding created by party
retention and compensation of expert witnesses have been a subject of perpetual criticism and
reform proposals since the nineteenth century.").
446. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
standard federal civil jury nowadays consists of six regular jurors and two alternates.").
447. See Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 383 F.3d 110, 118-19 (3d Cir.
2004) (noting the importance in trademark infringement litigation of conducting surveys among
those in the appropriate "universe" of consumers).
448. In presenting the two works to a focus group, both parties should be careful to play
the works without performance embellishments so that the listeners can hear them in
unadorned form and thus concentrate on their compositional similarities. See Pam Belluck, To
Tug Hearts, Music First Must Tickle the Neurons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at D1 (describing a
method of playing works on the piano to obtain "the 100 percent musical rendition" without
performance variations).
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about market displacement. If the plaintiffs and defendant's works
strike the parties' expected audience as dissimilar, those audience
members might be expected to buy both works-one is not a substitute
for the other.
The incorporation of focus group or survey evidence into the
litigation process would undoubtedly increase costs. But the initial
results of consumer surveys might induce one side or the other to
settle. If a fair sample of individuals, for example, overwhelmingly
found no similarity between the two works, plaintiffs might decide to
drop their suits or to quickly settle for a modest sum.4 4 9 This decision
might even occur where the plaintiff has located a musicologist who is
willing to testify about the technical similarities between the
plaintiffs and defendant's compositions. Thus, overall litigation costs
might be reduced as plaintiffs and defendants more accurately assess
the merits of their respective positions before a trial begins.
VI. CONCLUSION
We began our journey through Western music in this Article
with a community-based system in which composers created works for
public use and were subsidized by powerful and influential segments
of the community-that is, the Church, the royal court, and noble
patrons. When those traditional systems of support disappeared, the
need for copyright law became more urgent. At the same time, the
Romantic notion of the author as an individual creator with a unique
perspective gained popularity. Copyright law emerged as a
mechanism by which composers and other authors realize monetary
gain from their works and achieve a measure of control over their
exploitation. Although the ultimate goal of US copyright law has
always been the betterment of society as a whole, the means by which
policymakers have achieved that goal has been through incentives to
individual authors.
Today we have come almost full circle as society has begun to
regard music as a type of common property that should be available to
all at little or no cost. With the advent of the Internet and digital
media, music can be easily and perfectly distributed throughout the
world. The public now apparently views music as part of our common
cultural heritage that we should enjoy and build upon with virtually
no barriers. Consumer sentiment seems to be on the side of weak
copyright protection for both musical works and sound recordings
based on those works.
449. See supra Part IV (discussing Straughter v. Raymond).
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The question remains as to whether this shift in cultural
perceptions of music should affect the legal standards for establishing
copyright infringement in music cases. Arguably it should and
does-the jurisprudence of copyright may stand as the last guardian
against an unfettered free-for-all in which individuals may borrow
music without attribution, licensing, or remuneration. Without some
chance of compensation, professional composers may not be inclined to
continue to produce new works.
On the other hand, for the reasons advanced in this Article,
courts should refine the standard for infringement and the mechanism
by which plaintiffs prove infringement to account for the unique
attributes of music as creative expression. This Article argues that
"striking similarity" between works should be the standard for
infringement in music cases. In addition, access should be presumed
where the plaintiffs work has been reasonably made available on the
Internet. Courts should encourage both parties, moreover, to supply
expert testimony based on a detailed analysis and comparison of the
selection and arrangement of pitches comprising each work. Finally,
courts should instruct the parties to provide evidence from
appropriately constructed focus groups or consumer surveys so as to
better determine where the disputed works are strikingly similar to
the average lay listener. These changes will make more accurate and
less costly the task of determining whether what sounds alike is truly
alike.
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